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FLEMING JAMES JR. and ROGER F. PERRY*
NEGLIGENCE is not a ground of liability unless it causes injury or damage
to some interest which the law recognizes and protects. Moreover, it does
not make a defendant liable for any injury or damage that is not a conse-
quence of the negligence. The establishment of the requisite causal con-
nection is therefore an element of a plaintiff's cause of action for negligence,
to be pleaded and proven by him. And where a cause of action exists,
the question of causal connection will determine the scope of liability-the
extent of the injury or damage for which defendant will have to pay. The
question then naturally arises what is the kind of causal connection or
relationship that the law requires to be proven. Obviously the legal test
includes a requirement that the wrongful conduct must be a cause in fact
of the harm; but if this stood alone the scope of liability would be vast indeed,
for "the causes of causes [are] infinite'---"the fatal trespass done by Eve
was cause of all our woe." But the law has not stopped there-it has
developed further restrictions and limitations. The concept this development
has produced is generally called "proximate" or "legal" cause. To be sure
this concept is only one of the devices used to limit the fact and the extent
of liability for negligence.' In the progress of negligence law, however, the
concept of proximate cause has been greatly overworked to limit or control
both the liability of defendant and the effect of contributory negligence
because of many considerations which can be treated in a more meaningful
and significant way in connection with other issues, such as that of duty,
standard of conduct and the like.2 "Having no integrated meaning of its
own, [the] chameleon quality [of proximate cause] permits it to be sub-
stituted for any one of the elements of a negligence case when decision on
that element becomes difficult.... No other formula.., so nearly does the
tLafayette S. Foster Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
*LL.B. 1951, Yale Law School.
1. Limitations on the scope of duty and the rule of contributory negligence are, for
example, other such devices.
2. See GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXI'MATE CAUSE 78, 122 et seq. (1927); Carpenter,
Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause, 20 CALIF. L. Rzv. 229, 246-55 (1932) ;
and Maltbie, C. J., in Kinderavitch v. Palmer, 127 Conn. 85, 89 et seq., 15 A.2d 83, 86
(1940).
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work of Aladdin's lamp."' 3 The result has been a widely recognized confusion,
and as luxuriant a crop of legal literature as is to be had in any branch of
tort law.4 Perhaps recent years have seen a little headway made in dis-
pelling the confusion and taling some of the work load off of this weary
concept by separating other strands for analysis and treatment under other
more appropriate headings. If that is so much of the credit belongs to
Dean Green.
CAUSAL RELATION OR CAUSE IN FACT.
Through all the diverse theories of proximate cause runs a common
thread; all agree that defendant's wrongful conduct must be a cause in fact
of plaintiff's injury before there is liability. This notion is not a metaphysical
one but an ordinary, matter-of-fact inquiry into the existence or non-existence
of a causal relation as laymen would view it. Clearly this is not a quest for
a sole cause. Probably it cannot be said of any event that it has a single
causal antecedent; usually there are many. For the purpose of the present
inquiry it is enough that defendant's negligence be a cause in fact of the harm.
A rough working test of this relation, valid for most cases and enjoying
wide currency, is the "but for" or sine qua non test: defendant's negligence is
a cause in fact of an injury where the injury would not have occurred but for
3. Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEX. L. t~v. 471, 471-2
(1950).
4. The following is a suggestive but not exhaustive list of the literature: GREEN,
RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927); Bohlen, The Probable or the Natural Conse-
quences as the Test of Liability in Negligence, 49 AM. L. REG. 79, 148 (1901); Bingham,
Some Suggestions Concerning "Legal Cause" at Common Law, 9 CoL. L. REv. 16, 136
(1909); Smith, Legal Cause it; Actions of Tort, 25 HARv. L. REv. 103, 223, 303 (1911);
Terry, Proximate Consequences in the Law of Torts, 28 H.Av. L. Rv. 10 (1914); Beale,
The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 HARV. L. RZEv. 633 (1920); Pollock, Liability
for Consequences, 38 L. Q. REv. 165 (1922); Levitt, Cause, Legal Cause and Proximate
Cause, 21 MIcu. L. REv. 34, 160 (1922) ; Reese, Negligence and Proximate Cause, 7 CoRN.
L. Q. 95 (1922); Green, Are Negligence and "Proximate" Cause Determined by the Same
Test, 1 TEX. L. ZEv. 242, 256 (1923) ; Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. or PA. L. REv. 211,
343 (1924); McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HAv. L. Rv. 149 (1925); Burke, Rules
of Legal Cause in Negligence Cases, 15 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1926); Green, Are There De-
pendable Rules of Causation, 77 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 601 (1929); Carpenter, Workable
Rules for Determining Proximate Cause, 20 CALIF. L. RPv. 229, 396, 471 (1932) ; Peaslee,
Multiple Causation and Damage, 47 HI-ARv. L. REv. 1127 (1934) ; Carpenter, Concurrent
Causation, 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 941 (1935) ; Prosser, The Minnesota Court on Proximate
Cause, 21 MINN. L. REv. 19 (1936) ; Campbell, Duty, Fault and Legal Cause [1938] Wis.
L. REv. 402; Gregory, Proximate Cause in Negligence-A Retreat from Rationalization,
6 U. OF Cal. L. R.Ev. 36 (1938) ; Morris, On the Teaching of Legal Cause, 39 COL. L. RFv.
1087 (1939); Carpenter, Proximate Cause, 14 So. CALIF. L. REv. 1, 115 (1940); 15 So.
CALIF. L. Rrv. 187, 304, 427 (1941) ; 16 So. CALIF. L. Rav. 1, 61, 275 (1942) ; Morris,
Proximate Cause in Minnesota, 34 MINN. L. REV. 185 (1950) ; Green, Proximate Cause
in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEx. L. Rv. 471, 621, 755 (1950).
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defendant's negligent conduct. 5 It is probably safe to say that wherever this
test is met, the cause in fact relation6 does exist. But the test is not uni-
versally valid as a test of exclusion of causes in fact. There is one situation
where it will not work. If two independent causes concur to produce a
result which either of them alone would have produced, each is a cause in
fact of that result though it would have happened without either case (but
not if both causes were absent).7 Thus if two fires from separate sources
combine as they reach plaintiff's property, and consume it, each is a cause
though it be assumed (or shown) that the property would have been con-
sumed as completely by either fire alone.
So far as the substantive law of torts goes, the cause in fact aspect of the
requirement of legal cause gives little trouble, and it has been called a simple
one.8 Yet there are problems here which often beset the trial court and prac-
titioner and prove fatal to many a case. The most serious of these problems
is that of sufficiency of proof where the ascertainable facts are meager, or
where they present complicated questions of science, medicine, engineering,
or the like. Another-usually less serious-problem is in finding appropriate
language for the charge.
The problem of proof here is essentially like that presented by the problem
of proving negligence circumstantially, and the two often overlap. Thus in
res ipsa loquitur cases the requirement of defendant's exclusive control of the
injuring agency really calls for nothing more than proof tending to eliminate
other possible causes of the occurrence, so as to indicate that the negligence
of which that occurrence speaks is probably that of defendant. 9 But where
negligence is pinned on the defendant by direct or other sufficient proof
there may still remain a serious problem of proving the causal relation. This
is not always so-perhaps in the bulk of accident cases the real issues turn
5. Carpenter, Workable Rides for Determining Proximate Cause, 20 CAuIF. L. REv.
229, 235-6, 396-7 (1932) ; Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 H~Av. L. REv. 103,
108-10 (1911).
6. But not necessarily the relationship of legal or proximate cause. It has been said
that the "but-for" test is valid as a test of exclusion (but not of inclusion) for proximate
cause (except in the case of the concurring efficient causes given in the text). Smith,
Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HAIv. L. REv. 103, 109 (1911). A moment's reflection
will reveal that this statement and the one in the text (which is concerned with cause in
fact only) are not at all inconsistent. Carpenter, Workable Rides for Detcrinining
Proximate Cause, 20 CALIF. L. REv. 229, 396 (1932), remarks, obliquely, that the "but
for" rule may be used as a test for exclusion with respect to proximate causes and of
inclusion of causes in fact.
7. See PROSSER, TORTS 323 (1941).
8. GREEN, RATIONA=n OF PROXIMATE CAUSE, 136 (1927); Green, Proximate Cause in
Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEX. L. REv. 471, 474, 476 (1950). Of course, if unwarrant-
ably confused with other aspects of a negligence case, the "causation" issue thus created
may appear extremely complex.
9. See James, Proof of the Breach in Negligence Cases, 37 VA. L. REv. 179, 204 et
seq. (1951). The test of legitimacy of inferences from circumstantial evidence is discussed
in that article, at 185 et seq.
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on credibility of witnesses and the evaluation of conduct.10 But there is a
substantial number where causal relation rests on inference from circum-
stantial evidence, and in them is found the same test of delusive exactness that
is generally used to gauge the legitimacy of the basis for an inference from
circumstantial evidence. "Where," the New York court has said, "the facts
proven show that there are several possible causes of an injury, for one or
more of which the defendant was not responsible, and it is just as reasonable
that the injury was the result of one cause as the other, plaintiff cannot have
a recovery since he has failed to prove that the negligence of the defendant
caused the injury."" But here, as elsewhere, this test permits wide latitude
where facts are meager and where it is pure matter of guesswork where the
greater probabilities lie. A man is found dead at the foot of an unlighted
apartment hallway,' 2 or at the bottom of an elevator well one of the entrances
to which was left unguarded, 13 or at a railroad crossing after the passing of a
train that failed to whistle.'4 Death occurred at the unsafe place, or at the
hands of the negligently operated agency, but did it occur because of the defect
or the negligence? Would the precautions demanded by reasonable care have
averted the accident? Obviously no one knows-moreover no one even
knows what the probabilities are, and the courts are free to choose either a
10. Thus, where there are eye witnesses to an accident, their testimony will generally
suffice to establish defendant's breach of duty and direct causation of plaintiff's injuries.
11. Ingersoll v. Liberty Bank of Buffalo, 278 N.Y. 1, 7, 14 N.E.2d 828, 829 (1938). See
also Alling v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 156 Minn. 60, 63, 194 N.W. 313, 314 (1923)
("The burden is on the plaintiff to show that it is more probable that the harm resulted
in consequence of something for which the defendant was responsible than in consequence
of something for which he was not.") and Ramberg v. Morgan, 209 Iowa, 474, 487, 218
N.V. 492, 498 (1928) ("Where the proof discloses that a given result may have occurred
by reason of more than one proximate cause, and the jury can do no more than guess or
speculate as to which was, in fact, the efficient cause, the submission of such choice to the
jury has been consistently condemned by this court and by other courts." Quoted with
approval in Frye v. City of Detroit, 256 Mich. 466, 470, 239 N. W. 886, 887 (1932)).
Cf. the more liberal statement of the test found in Lunde v. Cudahy Packing Co., 139
Iowa 688, 701, 117 N.W. 1063, 1068 (1908) and quoted with approval in Bock v. FelIman
Dry Goods Co., 212 S.W. 635, 637 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) ("A cause being shown which
might produce an accident, and it further appearing that an accident of that particular
character did occur, it is a warrantable inference, in the absence of showing of other
cause, that the one known was the operative agency in bringing about such result.").
12. Ingersoll v. Liberty Bank of Buffalo, 278 N.Y. 1, 14 N.E.2d 828 (1938); Wolf
v. Kaufmann, 227 App. Div. 281, 237 N.Y. Supp. 550 (1st Dep't 1929) ; cf. Bornstein
v. Faden, 149 App. Div. 37, 133 N.Y. Supp. 608 (1st Dep't 1912), aff'd 208 N.Y. 605,
102 N.E. 1099 (1913) ; Reynolds v. Tex. & P. Ry. Co., 37 La. Ann. 694 (1885) ; Paine
v. Gamble Stores, 202 Minn. 462, 279 N.W. 257 (1938).
13. Hopkinson v. Knapp & Spalding Co., 92 Iowa 328, 60 N.W. 653 (1894); Bock
v. Fellman Dry Goods Co., 212 S.W. 635 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919); McCowat-Mercer
Printing Co. v. Taylor, 115 F.2d 868 (6th Cir. 1940).
14. Puckhaber v. So. Pac. R. Co., 132 Cal. 363, 64 Pac. 480 (1901) ; Burlington-Rock
Island R. Co. v. Ellison, 140 Tex. 353, 167 S.W.2d 723 (1943). Cf. Woodworth v.
N.Y. Central R. Co., 149 Ohio St. 543, 80 N.E.2d 142 (1948), soundly criticized in a
Note, 18 U. or CIN. L. REv. 371 (1949).
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postulate which will let the jury draw an inference of negligence, or its
opposite.
On the meager kind of showing described, therefore, it is not surprising
to find variant results.15 Courts which take a strict attitude stress the fallacy
of reasoning post hoc ergo propter hoc,16 and the likelihood of explanations
involving no causal relation: "It is a matter of common knowledge that
people sometimes fall downstairs in broad daylight" ;17 the pedestrian who
failed to hear the train might well not have heard the whistle, perhaps he
fainted on the tracks,'8 and so on.19  Courts which take a sympathetic view
point out that defendant's negligence greatly multipled the chances of an
accident of just the kind plaintiff claims happened, that the proven facts
are entirely consistent with its having happened that way, and that the evidence
does not strongly suggest an alternative explanation.2 0
15. On nearly identical facts even the same judge may come to contradictory con-
clusions at different times. Compare Wolf v. Kaufmann, 227 App. Div. 281, 237 N.Y.
Supp. 550 (1929) (denying recovery for death of plaintiff's intestate found unconscious
at foot of stairway unlighted in violation of statute) with Ingersoll v. Liberty Bank of
Buffalo, 278 N.Y. 1, 14 N.E.2d 828 (1938) (directly opposed). Both opinions were by
Finch, 3.
16. See, e.g., Springer v. Security Nat. Bank, &c. Co., 175 S.W.2d 797 (Mo. 1943)
(connection between alleged negligence of broker and loss to customer not established) ;
Payne v. Chandler, 41 Ga. App. 385, 153 S.E. 96 (1930) (evidence that plaintiff suffered
pain in heart and other ailments after dentist caused her to swallow unidentified, unpleasant
tasting liquid is insufficient to authorize inference of causal relation); Kramer Service
v. Wilkins, 184 Miss. 483, 186 So. 625 (1939) (connection between traumatic injury
to hand and cancer of skin at point of injury not established).
But cf., Reynolds v. Tex. & P. Ry. Co., 37 La. Ann. 694 (1885) in which the court
recognized the "distinction between post hoc and propter hoc," but found for the plaintiff
anyway because "the whole tendency of the evidence connects the accident with the
negligence."
17. Dissenting opinion by McLaughlin, J. in Bornstein v. Faden, 149 App. Div. 37,
42, 133 N.Y. Supp. 603, 611 (1st Dep't 1912), aff'd, 208 N.Y. 605, 102 N.E. 1099 (1913).
See also Wolf v. Kaufmann, 227 App. Div. 281, 237 N.Y. Supp. 550 (1st Dep't 1929).
18. Puckhaber v. So. Pac. R. Co., 132 Cal. 363, 64 Pac. 480 (1901).
19. For example, the unsympathetic rejection of inferences as to the cause of the
airplane crash in which the plaintiff's decedent was killed in Morrison v. LeTourneau
Co. of Georgia, 138 F2d 339 (5th Cir. 1943), criticized in Note, 38 ILL. L. Rv. 326
(1944).
20. See Reynolds v. Tex. & P. Ry. Co., 37 La. Ann. 694, 698 (1885) ("Where the
negligence of the defendant greatly multiplies the chances of accident to the plaintiff,
and is of a character naturally leading to its occurrence, the mere possibility that it
might have happened without the negligence is not sufficient to break the chain of
cause and effect between the negligence and the injury."); Lunde v. Cudahy Packing
Co., 139 Iowa 688, 117 N.W. 1068 (1908) (statement quoted in note 11, supra) ; Emery
v. Tilo Roofing Co., 89 N.H. 165, 195 Atl. 409 (1937); Gates v. B. & M. R. Co.,
255 Mass. 297, 151 N.E. 320 (1926); Burlington-Rock Island R. Co. v. Ellison, 140
Tex. 353, 167 S.W.2d 723 (1943); Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Ewing, 46 S.W2d
398 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); Bornstein v. Faden, 149 App. Div. 37, 133 N.Y. Supp. 608
(1st Dep't 1912), af'd, 208 N.Y. 605, 102 N.E. 1099 (1913); Cornbrooks v. Terminal
Barber Shops, Inc., 282 N.Y. 217, 26 N.E.2d 25 (1940); Note, 48 MAcH. L. REv. 536
(1950). Cf. Note 42, infra.
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In most cases the facts are not as meager as those described above and the
additional evidence generally reduces the area of uncertainty and enables
the court to make a much more sure-footed judgment on the matter of proba-
bilities, though even here there is often room for difference of opinion. On
the whole courts have tended to view with liberality the legitimacy of the
inference of causal relation in these cases. Thus where it appears how an
accident happened and also that the victim might have saved himself by
taking advantage of a precaution which it has been shown defendant negli-
gently failed to afford, courts have generally let a jury find the failure caused
the harm, though it is often a pretty speculative matter whether the precau-
tion would in fact have saved the victim.21  Of course if the possibility of
salvation is too clearly foreclosed by the facts of a given case, the inference
may not be drawn.22  Grade crossing collisions furnish familiar examples.
21. See REsTATEmFNr, TORTS §432, comment c. (1934). In Zinnel v. U.S. Ship-
ping Board, 10 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 1925), the issue was whether a guard' rope, the
absence of which constituted the alleged negligence of the defendant, would have pre-
vented the plaintiff's intestate from being washed overboard. L. Hand, J., said, in
reversing a judgment dismissing the complaint: "About that we agree no certain
conclusion was possible. Nobody could, in the nature of things, be sure that the intestate
would have seized the rope, or, if he had not, that it would have stopped: his body. But
we are not.. . justified, where certainty is impossible, in insisting upon it. We cannot
say that there was no likelihood that a rope three feet above the deck . . . would not
have saved the seaman. . . . Considering that such lines were run for the express
purpose, among others, of protecting seamen, we think it a question about which
reasonable men might at least differ whether the intestate would not have been saved
had it been there." See also Kirincich v. Standard Dredging Co., 112 F.2d 163 (3d
Cir. 1940) (seaman who could not swim fell overboard and was tossed a one inch
heaving line which landed two feet from where he was struggling; court found failure
to heave available ring buoy to be the cause in fact of the drowning. ". . . we think he
might (the appropriate grammatical mood) have saved himself through the help of
something he could more easily grab." Id. at 164); and Harris v. Pennsylvania R.
Co., 50 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1931) (semble, but Harris was a good swimmer and therefore
there was even greater probability of his reaching a ring buoy or heaving line, both of
which were available, had defendant's servants thrown one).
22. N.Y. Cent. R. Co. v. Grimstad, 264 Fed. 334 (2d Cir. 1920) contrasts nicely
with the cases cited in note 21 and illustrates the point of difference made in the text.
The man overboard could not swim, - but was seen by his wife while he was still
struggling. She rushed back into the cabin for a line, but when she returned he had
disappeared. The negligence alleged was the failure to equip the barge with a life buoy,
but the court found any causal connection between this failure and the drowning to
be "pure conjecture and speculation". There was nothing to show that if there had
been a life buoy on board the wife would' have got it sooner than she got the small line.
Ford v. Trident Fisheries Co., 232 M~ass. 400, 122 N.E. 399 (1919) is similar (negligence
'with regard to readiness of lifeboat immaterial as man disappeared immediately upon
falling overboard, and therefore could not have been saved even if defendant had not
been negligent).
It will be recognized that these cases illustrate the converse of the "but for" rule:
If the accident would have happened without defendant's negligent act, then such is not
the cause of it. See Russo v. Aucoin, 7 So.2d 744 (La. App. 1942) (negligence of Di in
pulling away from edge of road without signalling held not to be cause of accident
[Vol. 60: 761
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Where the victim's automobile is driven onto the crossing immediately in
front of an obvious and very audible train the jury still may find that the
driver's oblivious attention would have been arrested in time if the whistle
had been blown.23 But where the automobile is driven into the sixtieth car
of a freight train at an open and unobstructed crossing in the night time,
the absence of an unlighted warning sign (if proven) could scarcely be the
cause of the accident. "[I] f travelers on the highway could not see the moving
cars ahead of [them], they could not see the sign. '24
A recent case has perhaps introduced a new technique for dealing with the
"equal probability" problem, at least in a limited type of situations. In Sum-
mers v. Tice,25 two members of a hunting party fired simultaneously at game.
A pellet of shot entered the eye of a third member of the party whom the others
should have known to be dangerously near their line of fire. There was no way
to tell from whose gun the pellet came. In a suit against both, the California
court held them both liable to plaintiff. Yet only one defendant caused the
damage and in the case against each it is obvious that plaintiff could not prove
this element by the greater probability. The result actually does no more violence
in which D2 (going southward, as was Di) came speeding around blind curve, saw
Di in his path, but being unable to stop by reason of defective brakes, grazed D%'s car
and ploughed into the plaintiff's truck, which was going northward; even if Dt had
signalled the accident would have happened the same way) ; Feeherty v. Sullivan, 129 S.W.
2d 926 (Mo. App. 1939) (failure to warn by sounding horn not proximate cause of
injury where person to be warned and complaining of the failure was aware of the
impending danger); Stacy v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 84 Wis. 614, 54 N.W. 1091 (1893)
(failure to indicate location of, or to fence in, hole in ice not the cause of the drowning
of runaway horses since the horses could not have been halted or saved had all these
precautions been taken); City of Piqua v. Morris, 98 Ohio St. 42, 120 N.E. 300, 7 A.L.R.
129 (1918) (negligence of city in construction or maintenance of spillway not the cause
of overflow of pond to plaintiff's damage, where extraordinary rainfall would have
caused pond to overflow its embankment in any event).
23. Davis v. Boggs, 22 Ariz. 497, 199 Pac. 116 (1921); Johnson v. Southern Pac.
Co., 105 Cal. App. 340, 288 Pac. 81 (1940). Cf. Faust v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co.,
191 Pa. 420, 43 Atl. 329 (1899); Gregory v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 142 Va. 750,
128 S.E. 272 (1925).
Cf. cases in which the approach of a train was unknown to the plaintiff until both
he and it were at the crossing, the train having negligently failed to signal until it was
almost upon the crossing, and the noise of the belated signal instead of alerting and
saving the plaintiff caused his injury. See Roberts v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 35
Wis. 679 (1874) (plaintiff's horses frightened by train's signal); Walling v Central R.
Co. of N. J., 82 N.J.L. 506, 81 AtI. 987 (1911) (semble) ; Louisiana & Ark. Ry. Co. v.
Nix, 94 Ark. 270, 126 S.W. 1076 (1910) (semble).
Of course, where the engine was not visible or audible-e.g., if it is diesel powered
or a wind of great intensity is blowing-the jury will be allowed to find the failure of
the train to sound a warning to be the proximate cause of a death occurring at a crossing.
See Burlington-Rock Island R. Co. v. Ellison, 140 Tex. 353, 167 S.W.2d 723 (1943).
24. Texas & N.O. RR. v. Compton, 135 Tex. 7, 11, 136 S.W.2d 1113, 1115 (1940);
favorably commented upon by Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28
TEx. L. REv. 471, 477 (1950).
25. 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
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to the equal probability rule than many of the instances just cited-it simply
conflicts with that rule more dramatically. The court frankly faced this prob-
lem, pointed out that ordinarily defendants would be in a far better position
than plaintiff to offer evidence as to cause, and concluded, "When we consider
the relative position of the parties and the results that would flow if plaintiff
was required to pin the injury on one of the defendants only, a requirement
that the burden of proof on that subject be shifted to defendants becomes mani-
fest."20 This is like the technique used by the same court in the res ipsa loquitur
case of Ybarra v. Spangard2T but has even greater claim to acceptance here
where both defendants have been shown negligent.28 The alternative would
turn the innocent victim away without redress and exonerate two admitted
wrongdoers, one of whom admittedly caused the harm. Both the fault principle
and the objective of compensation are flagrantly violated by any such result,
and it would be a sterile and rigid procedure indeed that would force it in the
teeth of all the policies of the substantive law.29 If the reasoning of the Cali-
26. 33 Cal.2d 80, 86, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (1948).
27. 25 Cal.2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944); 208 P.2d 445 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949).
In this case, discussed in James, Proof of the Breach in Negligence Cases, 37 VA. L. REv.
179, 207 et seq. (1951), the plaintiff sued the four doctors and two nurses who attended
him while he was undergoing an appendectomy for damages for a traumatic injury to
his shoulder suffered while he was unconscious. The court said that under the circum-
stances "all those defendants who had any control over his body or the instrumentalities
which might have caused the injury may properly be called upon to meet the inference
of negligence by giving an explanation of their conduct." 25 Cal.2d 486, 494, 154 P.2d
687, 691 (1944).
28. Seavey says he knows of no other case "in which it has been held that the plain-
tiff has sustained the burden of proof where there was no evidence that it was more
likely than not that a defendant caused the plaintiff's harm". Seavey, Res Ipsa Loquitur,
Tabula in Naufragio, 63 HIAuv. L. Rnv. 643, 648 (1950). On the ground stated in the
text, however, he feels that the Summers case can be more readily supported than the
Ybarra case. Ibid. Any such distinction rests, of course, on accepting the importance
of fault as a criterion of liability. The reasoning in the Summers case would probably
have been approved by such authorities as Wigmore and Carpenter. See Note, 17 ILL.
L. REv. 458 (1923) ; Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause, 20
CALiF. L. REv. 229, 396, 406 (1932).
Other cases have reached a like result where the plaintiff was not a member of the
party, on a theory of concerted action or joint enterprise. Benson v. Ross, 143 Mich.
452, 106 N.W. 1120 (1906); Oliver v. Miles, 144 Miss. 852, 110 So. 666 (1927); cf.
State v. Newberg, 129 Ore. 564, 278 Pac. 568 (1929); Regina v. Salmon, (1880) 6
Q.B.D. 79.
29. It should never be forgotten that procedure should be the handmaiden, not the
mistress, of justice. This does not mean, of course, that the fundamental guarantees of
procedural due process are not vitally important. They are. But an observance of them
will always mean that rights and liabilities under the substantive law will in some cases
be unenforceable. And that is a cost, not an advantage, of these guaranties. Whenever a
procedural rule will consistently work to subvert substantive justice, it should be scru-
tinized to see whether any fundamental guaranty requires the rule to persist in such a
form. Here clearly it does not. Even granting sacredness to the fault principle, there are
many instances where procedural burdens have been shifted by statute or judicial ruling
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fornia court is accepted, interesting questions will come up as to its limits:
Will it apply to cases where one or more of the wrongdoers is not before the
court as a defendant? Will it cover the case where each of several defendants
has caused some harm but it cannot be told how much ?ao
In this matter of proof of causal relation, as well as in other issues, qualified
opinion evidence may be received in appropriate cases.31 In connection with
it two questions of sufficiency may arise. If in any given case the question of
causal relation is so esoteric that lay minds cannot form any intelligent judg-
ment about it without expert aid, opinion evidence from qualified witnesses
may be required as it sometimes is on the question of appropriate standards of
conduct.32 Probably no more crystallized rule than this can be formulated.
The courts have proceeded on a case to case basis, and there are few decisions
denying recovery which have laid stress on the want of expert evidence as to
the cause in fact of the accident.33 It should be noted that where the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is applied on the basis of judicial notice, expert evidence is
dispensed with upon this issue as upon any other.34 Expert evidence is often
on the basis of considerations like those present here. Res ipsa loquitur and the presump-
tion against bailees furnish ready examples. For a narrow view of the Summers case,
however, see Note, 37 Geo. L.J. 627 (1948).
30. See the opinion of the court in the Ybarra case, 25 Cal.2d 486, 494, 154 P2d 687,
691 (1944).
31. See note 33 infra, for some recent cases in which it has played a significant role in
the cause issue.
32. See Morris, The Role of Expert Testimony in the Trial of Negligence Issues, 26
Tzx. L. Rv. 1, 10 et seq. (1947).
33. Two such cases are Blarjeske v. Thompson's Restaurant Co., 325 Ill. App. 189,
59 N.E.2d 320 (1945) (expert was not asked his opinion as to whether condition of meat
caused plaintiff's illness; held, question of proximate cause left in realm of speculation,
surmise and conjecture even though nearly all other evidence pointed very strongly to a
causal relation) and Goodwin v. Misticos, 42 So.2d 397, 402 (Miss. 1949) ("The fact
whether the matter vomited up by Mr. Goodwin contained corned beef that was infected
by poisonous bacteria was also one capable of direct and demonstrative proof by a chemical
analysis"). There are several recent cases in which such evidence was offered where the
court might well have found the lack of it fatal. See Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co.,
363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 617 (1949) (expert traced explosion of liquefied natural gas to negli-
gence of manufacturer of tank in which it was stored) and National Lead Co. v. Schuft,
176 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1949) (experts ascribe puffs of flame and explosions to large
amounts of floating humus dust in the air). Cf. Western Tel. Corp. v. McCann, 128 Tex.
582, 99 S.W.2d 895 (1937) (defendant's experts successfully disproved any causal connec-
tion between a stroke of lightning coupled with the admitted negligence of the defendant
in the management of its wires and the death of plaintiff's wife by electrocution).
In Comeau v. Beck, 319 Mass. 17, 64 N.E.2d 436 (1946) it was the testimony of the
defendant's medical expert to the effect that a miscarriage might be produced by "'some
injury, [or by] the striking of the abdomen,' [which] was enough to support a finding
that the plaintiff's miscarriage was causally related to the accident"
34. See James, Proof of the Breach in Negligence Cases, 37 VA. L. REv. 179, 197, n.
55, 201, 202 (1951). Cf. Judson v. Giant Powder Co., 107 Cal. 549, 40 Pac. 1020, 29
L.R.A. 718, 48 Am. St. Rep. 146 (1893), and the discussion of this point in Morris, Res
Ipsa Loquitur in Texas, 26 Tnx. L. REv. 257, 261-2 (1948).
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required to establish the causal connection between the accident and some
item of physical or mental injury35 unless the connection is of a kind which
would be obvious to laymen (such as a broken leg from being struck by an
automobile).
Where opinion evidence is relied on to establish the causal link a question of
sufficiency may also arise in deciding whether the opinion has been expressed
in such terms as will support the needed conclusion. If a qualified witness
gives it as his opinion that the causal relation did exist or probably did exist,
there is not much question about the legal sufficiency of the testimony (subject
to general principles governing credibility).36 But cautious or hostile wit-
nesses are often unwilling to go so far, and there are serious questions and
variant rulings about the sufficiency of such expressions as "may have caused,"
"possibly caused," and the likeY7 Of course other factors in the case may lend
35. See cases cited in note 37 infra.
36. Tullgren v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 82 N.H. 268, 133 Atl. 4 (1926) ; National Lead
Co. v. Schuft, 176 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1949); Averdieck v. Barris, 87 Cal. App. 626, 262
Pac. 423 (1927) ; Shepard v. Carnation Milk Co., 220 Iowa 466, 262 N.W. 110 (1935).
In many cases each side has at least one expert witness who testifies concerning the
cause of the injury in definite, unequivocal language. The experts thus diametrically
opposed, a jury verdict for either party will be upheld. See Harris v. Wood, 214 Minn.
492, 8 N.W.2d 818 (1943) (strong expert testimony to support two alternative theories
as to death of decedent, only one of which involved defendant's negligence; jury verdict
for plaintiff upheld), discussed in Morris, Proximate Cause it Minnesota, 34 MINN. L.
REv. 185, 187 (1950).
37. "Possibility" of causal relation insufficient: Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Assn.
v. Johnson, 186 So. 297 (Miss. 1939) ; Wood v. W. E. Joyce Co., 228 App. Div. 729, 239
N.Y. Supp. 110 (3d Dep't 1930) ; Halnan v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 296 Mass. 219,
5 N.E.2d 209 (1936) ; Gerber v. Wloszczynski, 188 Wis. 304, 206 N.W. 206 (1925). In
Western Truck Lines v. Berry, 53 Ariz. 216, 87 P. 2d 484, 486 (1939) testimony that "one
might. . . say that an accident ... may or may not have anything to do with it" was held
"entirely too indefinite and uncertain" to establish the requisite causal relation. A similar
result was reached in Di Fazio v. J. G. Brill Co., 133 Pa. Super. 576, 3 A.2d 216 (1938),
the court stating that expert testimony that a causal connection was "extremely possible
and likely" would be insufficient.
Of course if the cause and result relationship of the type the plaintiff is urging
as the ground of the defendant's liability occurs in only one out of one hundred cases
there is insufficient evidence of it to go to the jury in the individual case at bar. Kramer
Service v. Wilkens, 184 Miss. 483, 186 So. 625 (1939). But a similar result was
reached in Howley v. Kantor, 105 Vt. 128, 163 Atl. 628 (1933), even though the
percentages greatly favored the plaintiff (eighty per cent of cases involved the more
serious type of tumor for which she was asking damages) on the grounds that the
expert testimony was not directed to the likelihood of the plaintiff's particular tumor
being of the more serious type.
On the other hand in Cornbrooks v. Terminal Barber Shops, Inc., 282 N. Y. 217,
26 N.E2d 25 (1940), expert evidence that a barber's electric vitbrator "would have
been a competent producing cause" of a detachment of the retina (together with absence
of proof of other probable cause) was held to satisfy the requirement as to probability.
The Appellate Division had found this evidence insufficient to establish the causal con-
nection. 255 App. Div. 522, 8 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1st Dep't 1938). The case of Wood
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support to the inference. Thus in a miscarriage case the Massachusetts court
has held such an expression sufficient when "taken in connection with the
plaintiff's testimony that [her] health was good before the accident" though
otherwise it would leave "the issue trembling in the balance." 38
A distinction should be emphasized at this point. We are concerned here
with the sufficiency, nwt the weight of the evidence, and on familiar principles
plaintiff is entitled to have sufficiency tested on the basis of the evidence
most favorable to him.39  It is only to that version of the evidence therefore
that the equal probability test (of the legitimacy of an inference) may properly
be applied. It is the jury's function, not the court's, to say whether plaintiff's
version of the case is sustained by the greater weight of the evidence. 40 A case
therefore in which the evidence most favorable to plaintiff (including the
opinion of qualified experts) affords the basis for an inference of cause is
not defeated as matter of law by defendant's evidence of a different version
of facts or a different theory of cause in fact.41 Where the evidence stands
in that posture, the question of what probably happened in the case is for the
jury even though the court might be inclined to accept the defendant's
version.
42
v. W. E. Joyce Co., supra, also involved a claim of traumatic detachment of the retina,
with the elimination of other probable causes.
38. Comeau v. Beck, 319 Mass. 17, 20, 64 N. E. 2d 436, 437 (1946) ; cf. De Filippo's
Case, 284 Mass. 531, 534, 188 N.E. 245, 247 (1933).
39. 9 WIGAMRrE EvIDENCE §§ 2494, 2495 (3d ed. 1940).
40. Id. § 2551.
41. Unless, in any given case, defendant's evidence is so overwhelming that under
general principles reasonable minds could not reject it and accept plaintiff's.
42. The actual decisions recognize this. National Lead Co. v. Schuft, 176 F.2d 610
(8th Cir. 1949); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Scroggins, 140 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1944);
Turner v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 140 Minn. 248, 167 N.W. 1041 (1918); Tullgren
v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 82 N.H. 268, 133 Atl. 4, 46 A.L.R. 380 (1926); Foley v.
Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949). But the reasoning in these
cases sometimes fails to describe with accuracy the basis for holding inapplicable the
rule that a jury will not be allowed to guess between two equally probable causes.
Thus in the Tullgren case the court says this equal probability rule "has no application
unless the existence of a sufficient cause or causes for the injury aside from the negli-
gence charged, is conceded or conclusively proved." (133 At. 4, 7). This statement
overlooks the fact that it is the weakness of plaintiff's case that usually brings the
restrictive rule into play and seems to suggest instead that a plaintiff can get to the
jury whenever defendant's explanation falls short of certainty. Unfortunately, perhaps,
the broad literal implications of this statement do not seem to be borne out by the
cases. See, however, Carpenter, Workable Riles for Determining Proximate Cause,
20 CA in. L. REv. 396, 399 (1932). Possibly the court in the Tullgren case only meant
to say that "where a cause is present which might produce a condition that has occurred,
and there is no other adequate cause proved, the matter is not within the equipoise rule,
and it may, under such conditions be found that the only thing suggested by the evidence
which could cause an effect found present, did cause it." Turner v. Hartford F. Ins. Co.,
185 Iowa 1363, 1377, 172 N.W. 166, 172 (1919). As we have seen, nearly all the cases
which employ even this relaxation of the equal probability formula, could with equal
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There is another type of question that presents problems of proof of fact,
which is sometimes treated under the heading of cause.43 This is the question
found in negligent entrustment and unlicensed operator cases, namely,
whether, in the former, the fact (when proved) of the driver's incompetence
can be used as evidence that the accident occurred as a result of this in-
competence, and in the latter cases, whether the lack of license is evidence
that the driver was unskillful in a way which contributed to the accident.
Defendant entrusts his automobile to one he should know is incompetent and
the latter injures plaintiff, a lawful user of the highway. Under these circum-
stances the owner's act is clearly a breach of duty towards plaintiff. But there
remains a further question before liability may be imposed. This may be put
in terms of causal relation between the negligence and the harm or in terms
of whether the injury arose out of the risk which made defendant's entrust-
ment negligent. In either event the factual inquiry is the same, did the injury
occur because the driver (borrower) was incompetent? Neither analysis will
permit recovery if the driver was acting with all due care on this occasion.
The result is that the negligence of the driver must be proven (just as in a
case of vicarious liability, but for different reasons). The only question is
whether proof of his incompetence which was introduced to show the owner's
negligence may also be used as evidence of negligent operation in the particular
accident in the case. The courts have said not, since on grounds of doubtful
validity the evidence would have been incompetent if offered for the latter
purpose.44
Where the car is entrusted to an unlicensed driver, or where defendant
himself drives it without a license, a similar question is presented (if the
licensing statute is thought to have safety in mind and not exclusively revenue,
or some other unrelated purpose), namely, did the harm result from the want
of a license, or (more accurately) because of the risk of unskilled driing
which the licensing statute sought to present? If the car was driven with all
the skill and care the law requires then the harm did not proceed from such
a risk; if the car was negligently driven, then it did. The further question
then arises: may the want of license be considered as sone evidence that
unskillfulness contributed to the accident? Some courts say no.45 But this
logic have been decided for the defendant because plaintiff's proof of cause rested on
conjecture. For examples, see cases cited in notes 20, 21 and 23, supra.
43. We shall deal with the problem of proof here, and leave for later discussion the
problem of whether the question should be assimilated to the issue of cause or the issue
of duty. See notes 104-106 infra.
44. In nearly all jurisdictions the character or propensity for carelessness of a person
charged with a negligent act may not be put in evidence even though it might throw
light "on the probability of his having acted carelessly on the occasion in question." See
1 ,Vxiom, EviDENcE § 65 (3d ed. 1940). This matter is discussed in James & Dickinson,
Accident Proneness & Accident Law, 63 HARv. L. REv. 769, 791 (1950).
45. Mfahowald v. Beckrich, 212 Minn. 78, 2 N.W.2d 569 (1942) lists several of the
jurisdictions in which both questions in the text have been answered in the negative. See
also Morrison v. Le Tourneau, 138 F. 2d 339 (5th Cir. 1943) : "There is argument that the
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effectively deprives the victim of any benefit, in a civil case, of a statute
concededly passed in part for his protection. Nor does the ruling seem
theoretically sound. The legislature has decided that the general safety
requires the activity in question to be limited to those who can demonstrate
at least a minimum of special skill. It is fair to assume that the unlicensed
as a class are far less likely than those licensed to have the skill for which
a license is required. And it is certainly true that when the unskilled attempt
what it takes skill to do, some of the intangible factors that go to make up
lack of skill are far more likely than not to have contributed to any mishap
that occurs. Frequently they do this in ways that are hard to prove; more-
over, what evidence there is in the matter is likely to be in the defendant's
hands. Both probability and policy, therefore, call for the rule that breach
of a licensing statute, if it is negligence to the plaintiff at all, should be prima
facie evidence that it is the "proximate cause" of any injury that ensues. 46
possession of only a pilot's license is evidence, or the basis of a presumption, that the pos-
sessor is lacking in skill as a [commercial] pilot. This does not necessarily follow. He
may not have chosen to take further examinations although he might have been abun-
dantly qualified for commercial or transport license for aught the record shows .... J
Id. at 341 (emphasis added). Why does the court insist in talking about possibilities
which are patently less than probable? Smith v. Whitley, 223 N.C. 534, 27 S.E.2d 442
(1943) is similar. The classic opinion is that in Brown v. Shyne, 242 N.Y. 176, 151 N.E.
197 (1926).
46. Cf. Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920) (fact that unlighted
vehicle was struck by another in the dark is evidence that the collision occurred because
of the lack of lights). Dean Green agrees with the position stated in the text. See dis-
cussion of Mundy v. Pirie-Slaughter Motor Co., 146 Tex. 314, 206 S.W. 2d 587 (1947) in
Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 Tax. L. REV. 755, 766 (1950), and
see Green, Proximate Cause in Coniecticut Negligence Law, 24 CoNN. B.J. 24, 32 (1950).
The lack of registration for an automobile involved in an accident evokes varied re-
sponses from different courts. In the great majority of jurisdictions the driver of an
unregistered automobile is not liable to those he injures if he is otherwise exercising due
care. Gilman v. Central V. Ry. Co., 93 Vt. 340, 107 Atl. 122 (1919); Armstrong v.
Sellers, 182 Ala. 582, 62 So. 28 (1913). See annotation, 163 A.L.R. 1375 (1946) (citing
earlier annotations) and cases cited by Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determing
Proximate Cause, 20 CAI~ir. L. Rav. 396, 410 n.133 (1932). This result should be reached
not, as many courts reason, because the violation of the statute is not the proximate cause
of the injury (see, e.g., Gonchar v. Kelson, 114 Conn. 262, 158 At. 545 (1932), but be-
cause the plaintiff is not within the scope of duty owed by the defendant with respect to
registration. See discussion of the Gonchar case by Green, Proximate Cause in Con-
necticut Negligence Law, 24 CoNN. B.J. 24, 28-30 (1950). See further discussion of this
point in the text, infra at note 107.
Massachusetts is probably the only state which still considers the unregistered vehicle
an outlaw or trespasser on the highway to which no duty is owed, Chase v. N.Y. Cent.
& H.R.RL Co., 208 Mass. 137, 94 N.E. 377 (1911), and which is responsible for all harm,
regardless of negligence. McDonald v. Dundon, 242 Mass. 229, 136 N.E. 264 (1922).
For some of the ridiculous bases upon which an automobile has been found to be unregis-
tered in Massachusetts, see Comment, 10 B.U.L. REv. 211 (1930). But Massachusetts has
apparently come to the point where it is at least unwilling to extend this rule to new situa-
tions. See Galbraith v. Levin, 323 Mass. 255, 81 N.E.2d 560, 563 (1948) in which the
owner was held not liable for injuries inflicted by a thief who was negligently driving his
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Multiple Causes in Fact:
It was pointed out at the beginning of the last section that no injury proceeds
from a single cause. But by law if no injury would have occurred to plaintiff
but for defendant's conduct, then defendant is liable-if at all-for the whole
injury. This is true regardless of its position in the string of acts leading to
the injury even though one or more of the other causes contributing to the
result also involved wrongdoing on the part of other persons. In that case
those others may also be liable but the law attempts no apportionment of
damages among such torifeasors, though a plaintiff is entitled only to a single
satisfaction of his claim.47 So if two negligently driven cars collide and the
collision injures a third person, both drivers are liable for his injury; or if A
negligently leaves an obstruction in the highway and B negligently drives into
it so that injury to C ensues, A and B are both liable to C.
A more serious question arises where defendant's negligence and another
cause for which defendant is not responsible would each have caused the whole
injury even in the absence of the other cause. Where both causes involve
the wrongful acts of legally responsible human beings there is virtual unanimity
among courts in holding both (or either) liable for the whole injury just as
in the situations described in the last paragraphs. 48 A leading case is Corey v.
Havener,49 in which the two defendants on motorcycles passed plaintiff's
horse, one on either side, and so frightened it by their speed, noise, and smoke
that the horse ran away and injured plaintiff. Plaintiff had recovery against
both defendants in spite of the obvious probability that either motorcycle alone
would have produced the result, 0 and the fact that each was sued separately
(the actions were tried together).
The authorities are divided, however, in the case where the other cause
(which would alone have produced the injury) is a natural force or the in-
nocent act of another.r' The case for denying liability here has been well put
car which was unregistered and in which, in violation of a statute, he had left the keys.
This decision directly overruled Malloy v. Newman, 310 Mass. 269, 37 N.E.2d 1001
(1941), which involved very similar facts and which rested heavily on the fact that the
automobile was unregistered.
47. PRossm;, ToRTs § 109 (1941).
48. See cases cited by Jackson, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 TEx. L. REv.
399, 413 nn.57-63 (1939) ; Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CAsnp. L. REv.
413, 433 n.131-34 (1937).
49. 182 "Mass. 250, 65 N.E. 69 (1902).
50. As a matter of fact this point was not mentioned by the court but the case has
been almost universally cited for it. Defendants' contentions on appeal centered around
the impossibility of telling which motorcycle frightened the horse. The court decided that
under the evidence the jury was warranted in finding that they both did, and that defend-
ant was not entitled to instructions requiring the jury to find which of the defendants was
to blame and to assess all the damages only against such one (if either).
51. E.g., two fires, one negligently set by the defendant and the other the product of
nature (lightning) combine and are blown across the plaintiff's property, burning his
house. Or, a boy loses his balance and is falling to his death (or to serious injury) on
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by Edgerton. He concedes that defendant's act stands in the same logical
relation to the result "whether the other is a wrongdoer, an innocent person,
or a thunderstorm." "But," he continues, "our sense of justice demands the
imposition of liability when the harm should not have happened but for the
wrongful act of human beings, while it does not make the same demand when
the harm would have been produced by an innocent person or a natural force,
if there had been no wrongful huan action. '5 2 The opposing view, which
appears to be of greater merit, rejects this reasoning and holds the wrongdoer
in the case put.53 In terms of the fault principle the argument for the majority
position is that after all defendant has committed a wrong and this has been
in fact a cause of the injury; further, such negligent conduct will be more
effectively deterred by imposing liability than by giving the wrongdoer a
windfall in cases where an all-sufficient innocent cause happens to concur with
his wrong in producing harm. If the objective of compensating accident
victims be stressed, the scale is tipped heavily in favor of liability, however
evenly balanced the opposing arguments in terms of fault.
So far we have been dealing with cases where the harm is not even theoreti-
cally apportionable, either because none of it would have happened but for
defendant's negligence or because there would be no feasible way, even in
the light of omniscience, to attribute any identifiable part of it to defendant's
act rather than another cause, as in the case of the two fires which unite
to burn property which either alone would have consumed. But there are
many situations in which each of several causes (without the concurrence of
any of the others) produces some (but not all the) harm. In such a case it
may be hard or even impossible on the facts practically available to tell just
how much of the harm each of these causes brought about, but at least in
theory (i.e. to the eye of omniscience) they are capable of separation. Where
this is the case, each of the defendants-responsible for these causes may still
be liable for the whole injury. This will be so where they acted in concert
or in the course of a joint enterprise so that each is responsible vicariously
rocks below when he is caught upon the defendant's wires, with respect to which the de-
fendant is negligent toward him, and electrocuted. Or, a house so undermined by the
pounding of the sea that it would topple at the next high tide is negligently destroyed by
defendant's fire hours before high tide occurs. See Peaslee, Mfultiple Causation and
Damage, 47 HAgv. L. Rnv. 1127, 1135 (1934).
52. Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. OF PA. L. RE V. 211, 343, 346, 347 (1924). This posi-
tion is also taken by Peaslee, Multiple Causation & Damage, 47 HARV. L. REv. 1127
(1934), and is supported in the cases by Cook v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co.,
93 Wis. 624, 74 N.W. 561, 40 L.R.A. 457, 67 Am. St. Rep. 830 (1898) (two fires, one
caused by the defendant's negligence and the other of natural origin) ; Geuder, &c. Co. v.
Milwaukee, 147 Wis. 491, 133 N.W. 835 (1911) (approves Cook case rule; plaintiff's
basement flooded as result of extraordinary rain and bursting of defendant's sewer).
53. Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45
(1920) repudiates the rule of the Cook case in toto, on identical facts. Carpenter, Con-
current Causation, 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 941 (1935) approves this position, as does the
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 432, illustration 7 (1934).
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for the acts of the others.5 4 The notion of action in concert involves the
intentional aiding or abetting of a wrong, the "coming [together] to do an
unlawful act,"'5 5 as where several ruffians set upon a man and beat him, each
inflicting separate wounds. This concept has limited application to the field of
accidental injuries. joint enterprise is more appropriate to this field but this
concept is rarely invoked except in connection with contributory negligence.56
Even where defendants are not all liable for the whole injury, there are some
situations where one is liable for the whole but the other is not. Where, for
instance, A's act injures plaintiff and also foreseeably exposes him to further
injury by B, A is liable for the whole harm, but B only for that part of it which
he inflicted. That would be the case if one driver negligently ran down a
pedestrian and another driver ran over him as he was lying there, breaking his
leg.5 7 Another situation where this notion is commonly applied is that where,
after defendant negligently injures plaintiff, a doctor's treatment of the injury
negligently makes it worse. The defendant is liable for the whole injury in-
cluding the aggravation although the doctor would of course be liable only for
the aggravation his malpractice caused.Ys Another case in which one defendant
54. HARPr, LAw oF ToRTs § 302 (1933) ; PnossER, ToRTs §§ 65, 109 (1941).
55. Sir John Heydon's Case, 11 Co. Rep. 5, 77 Eng. Rep. 1150 (1613); Williams v.
Sheldon, 10 Wend. 654 (N.Y. Surr. 1833); and cases cited in Prosser, Joint Torts and
Several Liability, 25 CALIw. L. RaV. 413, 429 (1937). Of course, all the defendants will
be jointly liable for the entire damage if it is viewed as single and indivisible. See note
72 infra.
56. PRossER, TORTS §65 (1941).
57. Adams v. Parrish, 189 Ky. 628, 225 S.W. 467 (1920). See also Morrison v.
Medaglia, 287 Mass. 46, 191 N.E. 133 (1934) (successive automobile collisions) ; Sawdey
v. R. W. Rasmussen Co., 107 Cal. App. 467, 290 Pac. 684 (1930) (similar); Thornton
v. Eneroth, 177 Wash. 1, 30 P. 2d 951 (1934) (similar) ; but cf. Young v. Dille, 127
Wash. 398, 404, 220 Pac. 782, 784 (1923) ("[N]either of the actors in the wrong could be
responsible for the injuries caused by the other.").
58. RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 457 (1934) is in accord so far as risks normally recognized
as ordinarily incident to medical treatment are concerned. See also Sauter v. N.Y. Cent.
& H. R. R. R., 66 N.Y. 50 (1876); Viou v. Brooks-Scanlon Lumber Co., 99 Minn. 97,
108 N.W. 891 (1906); Covington v. Keal, 280 Ky. 237, 133 S.W.2d 49 (1939); Ross
v. Stamford, 88 Conn. 260, 91 Atl. 201 (1914); and cases in Notes, 8 A.L.R. 506
(1920) ; 39 A.L.R. 1268 (1925) ; 126 A.L.R. 912 (1940) ; 79 A.L.R. 351, 369 (1932).
If this were not so, the situation would be intolerable unless the two actions were
joined or tried together. The first defendant could escape liability for the aggravation
by showing the doctor's negligence to one jury, leaving plaintiff with only a malpractice
case-one of the trickiest and most difficult to maintain in the field of dccident law.
A strange and unjust wrinkle is added' in many courts. If the defendant selects
the doctor whose negligence aggravates the original injury he (defendant) is not
responsible for the doctor's actions provided he is not negligent in the selection or
employment of the doctor. This faux pas (Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining
Proximate Cause, 20 CALIf. L. REv. 491, 538 (1932)) rests squarely on the identity of
the party selecting the doctor and results from treating the problem not as one of duty
or causation but as one of "master and servant." The reasoning, which is entirely in-
apposite to the case, is that the defendant-doctor relationship is not one imposing vicarious
liability on the defendant as master for the dqctor as servant. A straw man is created
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will be liable for all the injury is that in which he is vicariously responsible for
the conduct of the others acting with him, and each inflicts some injury,9
Except in the situations described in the last two paragraphs, the prevailing
rule is that where each of several defendants causes only part of defendant's
injury, so that the parts would be capable of separation if all the facts were
known, then each is liable only to the extent of that part. Thus where two
dogs run together and kill sheep, each of the separate owners of the dogs is
liable only for the sheep his dog killed.60 If each of several riparian owners
pollutes a stream somewhat, he is liable only for the damage resulting from his
own contribution to the pollution 61 (unless of course it can be said that none
of the damage would have resulted but for his contribution 02 in which case
in order to be knocked down, a process which would tend to benefit wealthy or corporate
defendants accustomed to having their own medical staff treat their accident victims.
The cases are collected in Notes, 8 A.L.R. 506, 515 (1920) ; 39 A.L.R. 1268, 1269 (1925) ;
126 A.L.R. 912, 916 (1940). In most of these same jurisdictions the defendant would
be responsible for the doctor's negligence if the plaintiff had selected the doctor oq
grounds that the original defendant's negligence "continued in force" or that "the
Doctor's negligence is one of the foreseeable risks which made the defendant's conduct
negligent to the plaintiff."
59. Still another application of this principle is found in cases where the defendant's
negligence has injured the plaintiff, causing damage for which defendant is liable and
leaving plaintiff's body in a weakened condition, susceptible to further harm of the same
nature. The defendant is liable for such further harm if it is brought on by a third
person and may be so liable if plaintiff himself has caused it. See Mitchell v. Legarsky,
95 N.H. 214, 60 A.2d 136 (1948), noted in 2 VAND. L. REv. 329 (1949) ; Prosser, The
Minnesota Court on Proximate Cause, 21 MIVNN. L. REv. 19, 44, n.121 (1936) ;
REsTATEmENT, ToRzs §§458-460 (1934), criticized in Carpenter, Proximate Cause, 14
So. CALin. L. REv. 1, 416, 449-450 (1941).
60. Van Steenburgh & Gray v. Tobias, 17 Wend. 562, 563 (N.Y. 1837) ("The
difficulty in estimating the separate injury done by each dog, is not an argument of
sufficient strength to warrant the injustice of punishing a man who is entirely innocent.").
See also Russel v. Tomlinson & Hawkins, 2 Conn. 206 (1817) ; Adams v. Hall & Cootwire,
2 Vt. 9, 19 Am. Dec. 690 (1829); Denny v. Correll, 9 Ind. 72 (1857); Anderson v.
Halverson, 126 Iowa 125, 101 N.W. 781 (1904); Stine v. McShane, 55 N.D. 745, 214
N.W. 906 (1927). Cf., however, Stephens v. Schadler, 182 Ky. 833, 207 S.W. 704 (1919)
in which the court was apparently willing to transfer a concert of action among the dogs
to their owners. Cf. also cases in which the injuring animals are kept in a common herd,
and the owner of a small portion of the herd is held liable for the total damage. Wilson
v. White, 77 Neb. 351, 109 N.W. 367 (1906); Ushirohira v. Stuckey, 52 Cal. App. 526,
199 Pac. 339 (1921).
61. Chipman v. Palmer, 77 N.Y. 51, 33 Am. Rep. 566 (1879); Martinowski v. City
of Hannibal, 35 Mo. App. 70 (1889); City of Mansfield v. Brister, 76 Ohio St. 270, 81
N.E. 631 (1907); Standard Phosphate Co. v. Lunn, 66 Fla. 220, 63 So. 429 (1913);
Mitchell Realty Co. v. West Allis, 184 Wis. 352, 199 N.W. 390 (1924); Masonite v.
Burnham, 164 Miss. 840, 146 So. 292 (1933). Annotations in 9 A.L.R. 939 (1920);
35 A.L.R. 409 (1925) ; 91 A.L.R. 760 (1934).
62. Where each of several defendants has inflicted some actual injury, in itself neg-
ligible and harmless, but the cumulative effect of the many similar small injuries is some
appreciable, serious damage, it would seem to be just to impose liability upon each.
The surrounding circumstances (e.g., the high degree of pollution already found in a
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he would probably be liable for it all).63
Where each of several independent actors has inflicted successive injuries,
each actor's liability is limited again to his own contribution to the injury
(except as we have seen the original actor will be liable for the later injuries if
they arise from a risk the likelihood of which made his conduct negligent).64 A
like result is reached when the same defendant by two successive acts causes
separate injuries, and the defendant is not liable for the first but is for the
second act. Thus where a trolley runs down a careless pedestrian and the
stream) make the action of each (e.g., the addition of but a slight legally innocent
discharge) unreasonable, and subject him to liability even though his conduct if it occurred
by itself would be innocent. Statements to this effect are found in Voodyear v. Schaefer,
57 Md. 1, 10, 40 Am. Rep. 419 (1881) (pollution of river); Hillman v. Newington, 57
Cal. 56 (1880) (use of water in which plaintiff had prior rights) ; United States v. Luce,
141 Fed. 385, 411 (C.C.D. Del. 1905) (smoke from two factories); Hill v. Smith, 32 Cal.
166 (1867) (pollution); D. & H. Canal Co. v. Torrey, 33 Pa. 143 (1859) (filling river
with refuse); Lawton v. Herrick, 83 Conn. 417, 428, 76 At. 986 (1910) (pollution).
A slightly different situation is presented in the illustration suggested by Kay, J., in
Blair & Sumner v. Deakin, 57 L.T.R. 522, 525 (Ch. Div. 1887) (each of tvo manufac-
turers discharges a chemical, harmless in itself, which combines chemically with the
other's discharge to cause a pollution).
63. Cf. Wright v. Cooper, 1 Tyler 425 (Vt. 1802) (two dams across creek cause flood-
ing of plaintiff's land; neither dam alone would have caused any damage); Town of
Sharon v. Anaheim Realty Corp., 97 Vt. 336, 123 Adt. 192 (1924) (ice jam caused by pier
of one defendant and dam of other, neither of which alone could have caused any damage) ;
Weideman v. East Jersey Water Co., 91 Atl. 338 (N.J. 1914). But cf. Woodland v.
Portneuf Marsh Irr. Co., 26 Idaho 789, 146 Pac. 1106 (1915) (damages to be apportioned
among defendants).
Perhaps in these cases, before liability is imposed, the plaintiff will be required to
establish that the defendant knew or had reason to know of the circumstances which
made it likely that his conduct would cause injury. For suggestive analogies, see
Folsom v. Apple River Log-Driving Co., 41 Wis. 602 (1877); McKay v. Southern
Bell T. & T. Co., 111 Ala. 337, 19 So. 695 (1896).
64. Notes 57 and 58, supra, deal with situations where an original wrongdoer will
be liable for harm done by later wrongdoers. Cases where each of successive wrong-
doers was held liable only for the amount of harm directly contributed by himself, are:
Freshwater v. Bulmer Rayon Co., (1933) Ch. 162 (pollution of stream by two defendants,
operating same plant in successive periods); Coleman Vitrified Brick Co. v. Smith,
175 S.V. 860 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) (damages to plaintiff through operation of brick
kiln by successive owners on adjacent property); Albrecht v. St. Hedwig's Soc., 205
Mich. 395, 171 N.W. 461 (1919) (successive assaults upon the plaintiff); McGannon
v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 160 Minn. 143, 199 N.W. 894 (1924) (workman con-
tracted silicosis through negligence of successive employers). Cf. Golden v. Lerch
Bros., Minn. Sup. Ct., 1937 (on facts similar to the McGannon case the court held
that both defendants were properly joined in one action and each was liable for the
entire damage since there could be no logical basis for assigning part of the damage
to one defendant and part to another. This result was approved by Prosser, Joint Torts
and Several Liability, 25 CAIF. L. REv. 413, 443, n. 182 (1937), and Note, 21 MiNN.
L. REv. 616 (1937). However, on reargument the court completely changed its position
and held, with the justice who wrote the former opinion dissenting, that under the evi-
dence one defendant could be held, the other could not; 281 N.W. 249 (Minn. 1937)).
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motorman injures him again through negligence in trying to extricate him
from his position of danger, the company will be liable for the second but not
for the first injury.65 And an employer who exposed his workman to the danger
of silicosis over a period of time extending back beyond the statute of limita-
tions will be liable for the aggravation of the disease caused by the exposure
within the statutory period.6°
At the time of their injuries accident victims are in all sorts and manners of
diverse conditions, physically, mentally, financially, and in many other ways.
And these preexisting conditions may have the greatest bearing on the extent
of the injury actually suffered by any particular plaintiff in a given case. Thus
the same slight blow in the abdomen might cause only fleeting discomfort to a
man but a miscarriage to a pregnant woman.' Or a slight touch, scarcely
noticed by the recipient, might be so aggravated by the presence of latent
disease at the point of impact as to cause the loss of the use of a limb. s These
situations too involve concurring causes just as do the situations we have been
discussing before in this section. And the cases will be seen to fall into the
same patterns. Thus defendant's act may be a cause in fact of the whole injury
(as in the case of the miscarriage or the diabetic's leg), and where it is not even
theoretically divisible defendant will be liable for the whole of it.0 9 But de-
fendant's act may only aggravate an illness or injury which would have caused
some harm anyway, or accelerate a loss-death, for instance, which would
65. Deutsch v. Connecticut Co., 98 Conn. 490, 119 At. 891 (1923). See also
Kinderavitch v. Palmer, 127 Conn. -85, 15 A.2d 83 (1940) (careless plaintiff struck by
eastbound train and hurled, unconscious, onto westbound track where train ran over
him and severed his arm).
66. Pieczonka v. Pullman Co., 89 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1937) (plaintiff must establish
the injuries inflicted within the period for which the defendant is responsible). Cf. Golden
v. Lerch, 281 N.W. 249, 253 _(Minn. 1937), which agrees in principle, but in which the
court states "the statute [of limitations] is generally considered an affirmative defense.
* . . Where part of the plaintiff's demand is barred and part is not, the defendant is
obliged to prove specifically the part that falls within the protection of the statute."
67. Cf. cases where recovery has been allowed for miscarriage caused by fright,
e.g., Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., 48 Min. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892). But cf. Tort
Liability for Miscarriage "Caused" by Fright, 15 U. OF CHL L. REv. 188 (1947).
68. Vosburg v. Putney, 78 Wis. 84, 47 N.W. 99 (1890) ; 80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403
(1891); 86 Wis. 281, 56 N.W. 915 (1893). Cf. O'Bauer v. Katz Drug Co., 49 S.W.
2d 1065 (Mo. App. 1932) (because of menopause woman susceptible to serious injury
from slight fall); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Wright, 183 Ky. 634, 210 S.W. 184 (1919)
(recovery for death from creosote poisoning would be allowed even though decedent
peculiarly susceptible to such poisoning).
69. See cases cited in note 68 supra; RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 461 (1934) ; Owen v.
Dix, 210 Ark. 562, 196 S.W. 2d 913 (1946) (plaintiff's weakened spinal condition set
off by injuries received when a passenger in bus which left road); Larson v. Boston
Elevated Ry., 212 Mass. 262, 98 N.E. 1048 (1912) (tuberculosis' brought out by injury
received while on street car) ; Maroney v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry., 123 Minn. 480,
144 N.W. 149 (1913) (woman's internal ailment); RIESTATEmENT, TORTs § 458, comment
a (1934).
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have taken place anyway. And in such a case defendant's liability extends only
to the amount of harm which he in fact caused.7 °
As a matter of substantive law these limitations on a defendant's liability
seem fair enough. The rub comes from the frequent difficulty of proof. Under
a strict technical view plaintiff may be put to the burden of proving by the
greater probability not only the fact but the amount of damage which can be
traced to defendant's act as a prerequisite to recovering anything. This would
often lead to the unlovely spectacle of turning a plaintiff away without redress
although he has shown that he has suffered some damage at the hands of each
of several defendant wrongdoers and what the aggregate amount of the dam-
ages comes to.rl To avoid this harsh result, courts have evolved several
techniques.
(a) They have tended to find a single indivisible injury in many question-
able cases. There is often room for viewing the matter either way, as in a
pollution case or smoke or stench nuisance cases, where the total condition
70. Schwingschlegl v. City of Monroe, 113 Mich. 683, 72 N.W. 7 (1897) (ankle
diseased and injured previously, but defendant liable for increase in pain, suffering,
disability and expense incurred by reason of accident in question); Watson v. Rhein-
derknecht, 82 Minn. 235, 84 N.W. 798 (1901) (aggravation of long-standing war
injuries) ; Gates v. Fleischer, 67 Wis. 504, 510, 30 N.W. 674 (1886) (plaintiff suffering
from blood poisoning; disease aggravated by defendant's malpractice. Court upholds
charge that "it will be necessary, as best you may from the evidence, to distinguish
the pain, suffering, and injuries or ill health of the plaintiff, if any, chargeable to the
fault of the defendant, from those. chargeable to her condition when the defendant was
called: in to treat her.").
71. See Tucker Oil Co. v. Matthews, 119 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938)
(directed verdict for defendant, one of several negligent polluters of stream, even
though plaintiff showed that his negligence caused some damage, because plaintiff did
not and could not show how much damage resulted from his negligence); Deutsch v.
Connecticut Co., 98 Conn. 482, 119 Atl. 891 (1923) (plaintiff's intestate was contributorily
negligent when struck by trolley but then, while lying on the tracks, was further
injured by negligence of motorman in reversing car; defendant was responsible for
injuries inflicted through latter actions of motorman, but since plaintiff did not show
which injuries he suffered before the car was stopped and which he suffered by being
rolled under the car when it was reversed, jury could only surmise and conjecture on
the question of damages; directed verdict for defendant upheld); Slater v. Pacific
American Oil Co., 212 Cal. 648, 300 Pac. 31 (1931) (land damaged by deposits of
substances negligently permitted to run down ravine by defendant and others; injunction
granted but award of damages reversed for lack of specific evidence of defendant's
contribution to the total deposit) ; and Note, 17 ILL. L. REv. 458 (1923). Cf. Van Steen-
burgh & Gray v. Tobias, 17 Wend. 562 (N.Y. 1837), in which plaintiff sued for damages
to his sheep done by two dogs, one owned by each of the defendants. The court held
that the defendants were not jointly liable and said, in dictum typical of these cases,
"the difficulty in accurately estimating the separate injury done by each dog is not an
argument of sufficient strength to warrant the injustice of punishing a man who is
entirely innocent." Id. at 563.
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that actually did cause the harm would not have existed without the addition
of each increment.72
(b) The court may distort and expand the concert of action notion, finding
such concert, and entire liability, when under accepted usage, none is present.73
Either device (a) or (b) will make each defendant liable for the whole
injury leaving all the defendants to work out among themselves any matter
of apportionment.
(c) The court may relax the requirements of proof as by adopting a lower
standard where the amount of damage is in question rather than the fact of
some damage. Some courts have expressly adopted a rule making this dis-
tinction.7 4 Others have let the jury make the best guess they can at apportion-
ment on whatever evidence has been made available in the case.7r This last
72. Tidal Oil v. Pease, 153 Okla. 137, 5 P.2d 389 (1931) (pollution of separate
streams running through plaintiff's pasture lands) ; Johnson v. Thomas Irvine Lumber
Co., 75 Wash. 539, 135 Pac. 217 (1913) (several independent companies permitted logs
to jam in river, deflecting flow and eroding plaintiff's land). Cf. the recent case of
Micelli v. Hirsch, 83 N.E.2d 240 (Ohio App. 1948), in which plaintiff's decedent,
knocked down by a car driven by H and immediately run over by one driven by B, was
then pronounced dead from his several injuries, any one of which could have caused
his death. The court found no concert of action, but did find an indivisible injury,
and held that joinder of B and H was proper.
It has been suggested that in Kansas entire liability will be imposed on each defend-
ant even though the injury is a divisible one, on grounds that the action of the defendants
was "concurrent". See Jackson, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 TEx. L. REv.
399, 406, n.28, and 416 n.71 (1939). But the case cited by Jackon, Kansas City v.
Slangstrom, 53 Kan. 431, 36 Pac. 706 (1894) is probably an example of the technique
described here. Cf. McDaniel v. City of Cherryvale, 91 Kan. 40, 136 Pac. 899 (1913)
(pollution of stream; concurrent wrongdoing found, but defendant saved from entire
liability by statute of limitations).
73. See Moses v. Town of Morgantown, 192 N.C. 102, 133 S.E. 421, 423 (1926)
(defendants who independently polluted same stream held jointly liable on ground that
each, with knowledge of others' actions, continued his own actions, which "ipso facto
creates a concert of action and makes a common design or purpose.") ; Arneil v. Paterson
[1931] A.C. 560 (two dogs, one owned by defendant, killed plaintiff's sheep; defendant,
who did not act in concert with other owner in any way, was held liable for the entire
damage on the ground that the dogs acted in concert). That the law should require,
and then be satisfied with, such methods for reaching desired conclusions is a sad
commentary upon its basic premises and its formalism.
74. Cases are collected in Note, 78 A.L.R. 858 (1932); See also McCoincc,
DAMAGES 102 (1935).
75. A typical statement is the following: "In such cases since the injured party
cannot supply the materials necessary to enable the jury to make an exact computation
of the damages in suit, the approved practice is to leave it to the good sense of the jury,
as reasonable men, to form from the evidence the best estimate that can be made under
the circumstances. . . ." Jenkins v. Pennsylvania I. Co., 67 N.J.L. 331, 334, 51 At.
704, 705 (1902). This attitude is quite commonly adopted. Eckman v. Lehigh & NV. B.
Coal Co., 50 Pa. Super. 427 (1912) (pollution in stream); Inland Power & Light Co.
v. Greiger, 91 F. 2d 811 (9th Cir. 1937) (erosion of land as result of river overflow).
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seems to be the usual way of handling the problem where plaintiff shows the
total extent of his injury and it also appears that defendant's act merely aggra-
vated a preexisting condition. After all this is no more a matter of guesswork
than assigning a money value to pain and suffering, or to "the death alone,"76
or to reputation, or an alienated affection.
(d) Where a plaintiff has shown the total amount of his damage, and
that defendant's wrong has made some contribution to it, the burden of
proving the extent to which this contribution fell short of the whole might
be put on defendant. There are many instances which would furnish analogies
close enough to support such a rule. Although the substantive law of damages
shields a defendant from liability for "avoidable consequences," the burden of
establishing their existence is on the defendant.7 7  Once delivery to a bailee
and his failure to redeliver are shown, the bailee has the burden of disproving
the very gist of his liability-negligence. 78 Once the delivery of goods sold
or the performance of services contracted for appears, defendant has the
burden of disproving the very breach of the contract-non-payment. 79 The
real question is not whether shifting this burden of proof would violate any
formal canon of procedure, but whether it is the fair and expedient thing to
do in view of defendants' generally greater access to the evidence in these
situations and of the relative hardships in those cases where no evidence is
forthcoming. The last means balancing the injustice of denying all redress
to a man who has shown himself entitled to some, against the injustice of
making a wrongdoer pay for more damage than he has caused. Eminent
authorities have advocated shifting the burden of proof in this way in suits
against concurrent or successive wrongdoers where the total damage caused
by all is theoretically divisible.8 0 There has as yet been scanty judicial
acceptance of such a rule though the California court has recently adopted
a similar one in a case where there was doubt which of two defendants caused
the whole harm.81 The rule may well gain wider acceptance, however, since
76. See Kling v. Torello, 87 Conn. 301, 306, 87 Atl. 987, 988 (1913). Cf. Schrayer
v. Bishop, 92 Conn. 677, 682, 104 Atl. 339 (1918) ("A man's estate is entitled to some
compensation for death alone without wandering into the somewhat hazy realm of an
individual's expectation of life or his probable accumulations... ").
77. McCoimcK, DAMAGES 130 (1935).
78. 8 WIGMORE, EvIDE NcE § 2508 (3d ed. 1940).
79. See CLAacu CODE PLEADING 610 (2d ed. 1940). Another example in the area
of contract law is the placing on the defendant of the burden of proving the excusable
impossibility of his performance. See WILL STONx, CoNmAcTs § 1937 (Rev. ed. 1936).
80. Wigmore, Joint Tortfeasors and Severance of Damages, 17 ILL. L. REv. 458
(1923) ; Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause, 20 CALIF. L. REv.
396, 406 (1932) ; Carpenter, Concurrent Causation, 83 U. OF PA. L. REV. 941, 944 (1935) ;
Jackson, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 TEx. L. REv. 399, 420 (1939); Note,
19 CALIF. L. REv. 630, 634 (1931). See also the discussion of Golden v. Lerch Bros.,
supra note 64.
81. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P. 2d 1 (1948). In its opinion the California
court suggested that the burden of proof on apportioning damages among concurrent
or successive tortfeasors might well be put on defendants. The two problems are very
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it fits well within the framework of familiar precedents and principles and
reflects the modem trend to emphasize compensation of accident victims and
a broad distribution of their losses rather than a more perfect tracing out of
the implications of the fault principle.32
(e) Where it appears that each of several defendants has contributed to
plaintiff's injury but a sufficient basis in the evidence for making an allocation
among them does not appear, the courts could of course arbitrarily divide
the damages among them equally or could allow the jury to do so on the
basis of whatever evidence it had before it.83 This result is eminently sensible
but perhaps it does more violence to some elusive overtones of our Anglo-
American common law tradition than a shifting of the burden of proof.
(f) Faced with this problem the court, in exercise of its equity powers,
could call all the independent wrongdoers before it and apportion the damages
among them as best it could. This desirable procedure is only rarely used.84
PROXIMATE CAUSE
We have seen how some reasonable showing of cause in fact is always a
requisite of liability. But such showing may not suffice for liability. There
may still be problems under the fault system and there would be even under
other systems of compensation. Workman's compensation schemes, for in-
stance, limit recovery to accidents which are regarded as incidental to the
employment, and this limitation poses questions which go beyond the mere
inquiry whether a given accident was the cause in fact of a specific injury,
or whether this causal relation was a substantial one. Schemes to compensate
victims of traffic accidents would need an analogous limitation, and so on.85
similar to each other. See, further, Note, 47 MIcH. L. Rzv. 1232 (1949); Micelli v.
Hirsch, 83 N.E. 2d 240 (Ohio App. 1948) (discussed supra note 72).
82. This was the answer made long ago by the legislatures of several states in the
situation that called forth some of the early decisions on this question-the worrying
and killing of cattle by dogs. See Dole v. Hardinger, 204 Ill. App. 640 (1917) ; Nelson
v. Nugent, 106 Wis. 477, 82 N.W. 287 (1900) ; Remele v. Donahue, 54 Vt. 555 (1882) ;
McAdams v. Sutton, 24 Ohio St. 333 (1873); Kerr v. O'Connor, 63 Pa. 341 (1869);
Worcester County v. Ashworth, 160 Mass. 186, 35 N.E. 773 (1893).
83. Miller v. Prough, 203 Mo. App. 413, 221 S.W. 159 (1920) ; Anderson v. Halverson,
126 Iowa 125, 101 NAV. 781 (1904) ; Wood v. Snider, 187 N.Y. 28, 79 N.E. 858 (1907)
(each head of cattle could be found to have done equal damage; liability in proportion
number of cattle owned by defendant bore to total number doing damage). See Buddington
v. Shearer, 37 Mass. 477, 479 (1838).
84. One instance is found in Mitchell Realty v. West Allis, 184 Wis. 352, 199 N.W.
390 (1924), noted in 3 Wis. L. REv. 245 (1925) (Supreme Court, in remanding to lower
court, ordered it to follow this procedure). This solution is only available when the
plaintiff seeks an equitable remedy (injunction, etc.) and the court, in order to give
complete relief, incidentally awards damages.
85. For limitations suggested for a proposed automobile accident compensation
system, see COLUMBIA UNIvERsrrY RESEARci COUNCIL, REPORT By COMMITTEE TO STUDY
COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACcIDENTS 245 (1932); FRENcH, THE AUTOMOBI0IE
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Our present system is not designed along any such functional lines but has
traditionally focussed attention on the defendant's individual fault and the
limitations on his liability bear the mark of the fault formula as we shall see.
It should be noted at this point that many courts and legal writers have
stressed the fact that policy considerations underlie the doctrine of proximate
cause.O Of course they do, but the policies actually involved often fail to
get explicit treatment. One consideration which is common to all cases under
any system is the practical need to draw the line somewhere so that liability
will not crush those on whom it is put. Even under comprehensive social
insurance for all vicissitudes to the body there would have to be limits on the
kinds of injuries to be compensated (many kinds like worry, loss of enjoy-
ment, prestige, etc., probably would not be), and on the amount of compensa-
tion. Under any system of more limited scope, liability is placed on indi-
viduals, groups, enterprises, and the like, rather than upon the whole of
society, and there will have to be further limitations to protect these groups
or individuals from being saddled with more than their fair share of the
social cost of accident. Under an individualistic fault system these limitations
will be geared to fault and will reflect the policy of making the extent of
liability reflect the degree of fault or the factors which make conduct blame-
worthy. As the fact of insurance and loss distribution increasingly permeates
our system and the importance of individual blameworthiness wanes, the
limitations (of proximate cause, or duty, etc.) may be expected to take on
more and more the character of limitations measured by what is felt to be
normally incidental to the kind of activity or enterprise which is footing the
bill (e.g. motoring, railroad transportation, the manufacture of canned foods,
the owning and management of apartments, etc.).s6a
Another policy consideration which pervades all the cases is the need to
work out rules which are feasible to administer, and yield a workable degree of
certainty.
There are other considerations which operate within a narrower sphere.
Some actions and some enterprises or classes of defendants have traditionally
been favored or disfavored for real or supposed considerations of policy. The
COMxPENSATION PLAN 53 et seq. (1933). Cf. questions of insurance policy coverage,
where the rubric "proximate cause" is used, not as in negligence law, but to separate
and define the risks or losses insured against. See Green, Proximate Cause in Texas
Negligence Law, 28 TEx. L. Rnv. 621, 635-6 (1950). See also Standard Oil Co. of
N.J. v. United States, 340 U.S. 54 (1950), in which the notion of "proximate cause"
is employed to limit the liability of the United States as insurer of a ship against "all
consequences of hostilities or warlike operations."
86. See, e.g., Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HAuv. L. Rnv. 223, 247-9; 303,
320 (1912) ; Dissenting opinion, Andrews, J., in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y.
339, 162 N.E. 99, 103, 59 A.L.R. 1253 (1928).




same thing is true of some defenses 8 7 The law frequently restricts or ex-
pands its handicapping processes (both substantive and procedural) to accom-
modate such notions. This process may be observed in the field of proximate
cause as well as elsewhere.
We now turn to examine the considerations by which our law limits liability
for negligent conduct even where a cause in fact relation exists. It is Dean
Green's view that all limitations on liability other than those imposed by the
cause-in-fact requirement should be administered as part of some issue other
than cause.8 8 But while this simple and helpful analysis has gained partial
acceptance by some courts 89 (and the American Law Institute), 90 this ac-
ceptance has been far from complete, and the present treatment would itself
be incomplete if it failed to take account of the many theories and lines of
reasoning which have had some currency in the decisions.
The Test of Foreseeability:
From the very beginning the notion of foreseeability has been inter-
twined with the development of liability for negligence. And the limitations
imposed by this notion have frequently been stated in terms of proximity
of cause or consequence. Thus in summing up the earlier law, Holdsworth
points out that in an action on the case there must be damage, but it might
be an indirect consequence of the wrong, and the courts were familiarized
with the concept of negligence by the need of determining whether the damage
complained of "could be said to be a sufficiently proximate consequence of the
87. Among disfavored actions may be listed fraud, libel and slander, and malicious
prosecution. Favored enterprises include governmental and charitable organizations and;
in some localities, the leading industrial interests (e.g., the coal mining interests in
earlier Pennsylvania jurisprudence). Defenses that have been disfavored include fraud,
statute of frauds, statute of limitations, truth in libel and slander, contributory negligence
and dilatory pleas in general.
88. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927), discussion of cases, 77-121 and
144-68 (both inclusive). For further exposition see Green, Are there Dependable Rules
of Causation?, 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 601 (1929) and Green, Proximate Cause in Texas
Negligence Law, 28 TEX. L. REv. 471, 621, 755 (1950).
89. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) ; Kinderavitch v.
Palmer, 127 Conn. 85, 15 A.2d 83 (1940); Sinram v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 61 F.2d 767
(2d Cir. 1932); Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S.
790 (1944) ; Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
90. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs §§ 281, 430 (1934). In the 1948 Supplement to the Restate-
ment, comment "e" to § 281 was expanded considerably and now accords to a much
greater extent, in approach and conclusion, with Dean Green's analysis. Commenting
upon the confused position of the American Law Institute, Seavey says, "Perhaps to
provide a transition period in which the courts might use either approach, the Restate-
ment of Torts,, first adopting to the full the theory of risk [citing § 281], at a later
stage recants and presents a confusing series of superseding causes [citing §§440-2]."
Mr. ustice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 48 YAIx L.J. 398, 408 (1938). (Seavey's
comments remain apposite despite changes in the 1948 supplement).
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defendant's act to entail liability," a question which in turn came to be re-
solved "by asking whether any ordinarily prudent man would have foreseen
that damage would probably result from his act."'91 Pollock, whose work on
torts is perhaps still the leading British authority on the subject, through all
his life insisted that the extent of liability for negligence was measured by
what was foreseeable at the time of the act or omission complained of.92 This
view, however, was never accepted by all hands as a universal solvent and
two leading English cases dramatically showed that liability would often be
extended to entirely unforeseeable consequences. 9 3 These cases and the writ-
ings of leading commentators led to a wide acceptance of the view expressed
thus by Beven: "The defendant's view of the possibilities of his act is very
material to determine whether his act is negligent or not; it is utterly im-
material to limit liability when once negligence has been established." 94 But
this view also failed of acceptance as a universal solvent, and many courts and
writers, continued to bring "foreseeability" into their discussions of proximate
cause. The matter cannot be left, therefore, by embracing the appealing (ap-
parent) simplicity of either of these extreme views. Foreseeability does play
a large part in limiting the extent of liability. "Attempts to escape from the
significance of foresight in the field of legal remoteness are attempts to escape
from our culture."9 5 On the other hand there may be liability for unfore-
91. 8 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 450 (2d: ed. 1937). Later on
Holdsworth says, "If we are basing liability on a negligent act, and if negligence con-
sists in the failure to foresee results which ought reasohably to be foreseen, it would
seem that the negligent person ought only to be made liable to the extent to which he
ought to have foreseen those results." Id. at 463.
92. POLLOCK, TORTS 8, 24 (14th ed. 1939). According to Pollock, "the accepted
test of liability for negligence in the first instance is . . . also the proper measure of
liability for the consequences of proved or admitted default." The test is whether the
damage is "such as the defendant could reasonably be expected to anticipate." See
Pollock, Liability for Consequewes, 38 L.Q. REv. 165 (1922) ; Goodhart, The Unfore-
seeable Consequences of a Negligent Act, 39 YALE L.J. 449, 458 (1930) ; Winfield,
Restatement of the Law of Torts-Negligence, 13 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 1, 3 (1935).
93. In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 560 (plank negligently
knocked into ship's hold caused spark at instant of impact which ignited flammable
vapor present in the hold and ultimately resulted in the total destruction of the ship
by fire); Smith v. London & S.W. Ry., L.R. 5 C.P. 98; L.R. 6 C.P. 14 (1870) (after
defendant's engine passed, fire, originating in or near dried cut-grass which defendant
had negligently left along right of way, spread through a hedge bordering right of way,
then two hundred yards across an adjoining stubble field, across a road, and burnt
plaintiff's cottage). Goodhart, Restatement of the Law of Torts, 83 U. or PA. L. REv.
968, 994, n.106 (1935) has argued that the consequences in the Polemis case were fore-
seeable. See also note 110 infra.
94. BEVEN, NEGLIGENCE IN LAW 89, n.2 (3d ed. 1908). See also Snith, Legal Cause
in Actions of Tort, 25 H~Av. L. REv. 103, 127-8 (1912) ; Christianson v. Chicago SPM
& 0 Ry., 67 Mfinn. 94, 69 N.W. 640 (1896) ; Isham v. Dow's Estate, 70 Vt. 588, 41 At.
585 (1898).
95. Morris, Proximate Cause in Minnesota, 34 MINN. L. REv. 185, 197 (1950). See
also discussion by Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. OF PA. L. REv. 343, 354 (1924).
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seeable consequences. The problem calls for further discussion which may
for convenience be broken down into more or less distinct considerations:
(a) Foreseeability of damage is altogether irrelevant in determining the
existence of the cause in fact relationship. Acts or omissions constantly help
to bring about consequences which no man will be held to foresee. It follows
that under an analysis like Dean Green's, foreseeability has no place in the
issue of proximate cause. But it does not follow that such an analysis would
exclude all consideration of foreseeability in determining the limits of liability,
as we shall see.
(b) It is well nigh universally conceded that unreasonable likelihood (fore-
seeability) of harm (however tenuous or fictitious that concept may be) 9 is
the gist of liability for negligence. This in itself, of course, is some limitation
on liability for acts and omissions that turn out to be injurious. Just how much
of a limitation it is depends upon how one views the scope of the duty to use
care. Courts and writers have from time to time taken the position that if
defendants should anticipate that certain conduct is fraught with unreasonable
probability of some harm to somebody, then the duty to refrain from that
conduct is owed to anyone who may in fact be hurt by itY. If such a notion
is accepted, it would open up very wide possibilities indeed as to the extent
of liability unless the court or jury were to consider some limiting factor (such
as the source and range of harm reasonably to be anticipated from the act)
in connection with the cause issue. Thus Andrews would consider the likeli-
hood that the cause "in the usual judgment of mankind" would produce the
result-whether "by the exercise of prudent foresight the result [could] be
foreseen,"--as a factor in determining proximate cause. 8
The view currently prevailing in this country, however, does limit the scope
of the duty to do or refrain from doing a given act to (1) those persons or
interests that are likely to be endangered by the act or omission, and (2)
harm (to such person or interest) from a risk the likelihood of which made
the act or omission negligent.09 Thus the careless pushing of a prospective
train passenger was not negligence to Mrs. Palsgraf who stood many feet
outside the range of probable effects of such conduct.100 And carelessness in
96. For criticisms of foreseeability as a test see Gregory, Proxinzate Cause in Neg-
ligence-A Retreat from "Rationalization," 6 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 36, 48 et seq. (1938);
Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 Tm-. L. REv. 755, 771-6 (1950);
EaRENzwEiG, NEGLIGENcE WITHOUT FAULT, 19, 58, 63 (1951).
97. Perhaps the best recent exposition of this point of view is to be found in the dis-
senting opinion of Andrews, J., in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 350, 162
N.E. 99, 101 (1928). See also Smith v. London & S.W. Ry. Co., L.R. 5 C.P. 98, L.R. 6
C.P. 14 (1870) (particularly opinion of Kelley, C.B., 6 R. 6 C.P., at 19, 20).
98. 248 N.Y. 339, 350, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
99. HARPER, LAW OF TORTS § 73 (1933) ; PRossER, TORTS § 31 (1941) ; RESTArEMENT,
TORTS § 281 (1934).
100. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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giving a gun to a young child is not negligence with respect to injury caused
by dropping the gun on plaintiff's foot, since the risk of the child's dropping
a fairly heavy object was not (we assume) so fraught with the chance of
injury as to make the entrustment unreasonable. 0 1 It is obvious that under
such an analysis of the duty problem, foreseeability is distinctly a factor which
puts a considerable limitation on the extent of liability, even that it should be
held to play no part whatever in determining the issue of proximate cause.'02
It is also clear that if this analysis of the duty problem is accepted, no good,
but only confusion, can result from repeating the same inquiries as to fore-
seeability under the cause issue as were asked and answered (or should have
been) under the duty issue. Where, however, the duty problem is analyzed
in the older, less limited way, or is not clearly analyzed at all, courts tend
strongly to impose pretty much the same limitations (i.e. those imposed by
the narrower concept of duty) by importing into the issue of proximate cause
a requirement of probability or foreseeability. 10 3
101. See Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause, 20 CALIF. L.
REv. 229, 231 (1932) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 281, illustration 2 (1934). See also Seavey,
Mr. Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 48 YALE L.J. 390, 405 (1939).
102. Thus in the Palsgraf case the question as to foreseeability was answered in the
negative (by the majority) under the duty issue, so the court was never faced with the
necessity for an inquiry into the issue of proximate-or any other-cause.
It should be noted that the extent to which the notion of foreseeability will limit
liability by limiting the scope of the duty owed will depend partly on how narrowly or
broadly we define the risk or hazard which must be foreseen. Cf. subsection (f), infra.
103. Milwaukee, &c., Ry. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469 (1876), involving the spread of a
fire, caused by defendant's steamboat, to plaintiff's sawmill several hundred feet distant,
has been the inspiration behind many opinions making this error. See discussion in Green,
Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 Tmc. L. REv. 621-3 (1950).
See also the following cases in which the crucial question-the scope of defendant's
duty-is by-passed and, because the results of the defendant's acts were not foreseeable,
the defendant escapes liability for those results on grounds that they were not-proximately
caused by his acts: Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Bigham, 90 Tex. 223, 38 S.W. 162 (1896)
(plaintiff injured when cattle, frightened by train noises, burst out of defendant's stock
pen through gate which had defective fastening) ; Wood v. Pennsylvania RR., 117 Pa.
306, 35 Atl. 699 (1896) (defendant's train struck woman at crossing and hurled body
fifty feet to platform, where it struck plaintiff); Evansville & T.H. Ry. Co. v. Welch, 25
Ind. App. 308, 58 N.E. 88 (1900) (similar) ; Uvalde Construction Co. v. Hill, 142 Tex.
19, 175 S.W. 2d 247 (1943) (defendant's dynamite explosion half mile away frightened
plaintiff's cow which trampled plaintiff's wife).
Two Illinois cases, commented upon by Green in Illinois Negligence Law IV, 40 IL..
L. REV. 1, 11, 12, 28 (1945) and in Merlo v. Public Service Co-A Study in Proximate
Cause, 37 ILT.. L. REv. 429 (1943), illustrate the potential dangers inherent in this im-
perfect approach. See Neering v. Illinois Central R.R., 383 Ill. 366, 50 N.E. 2d 497 (1943)
(woman assaulted in defendant's lonely waiting room where vagrants were known to
congregate; confusion, but no injustice, results from court's repetition of its inquiry into
likelihood of harm under both duty and cause issues). But cf. Merlo v. Public Service
Co., 381 I1. 300, 315, 45 N.E. 2d 665 (1942) (court found it negligent for defendant to
allow its wires to sag and become uninsulated but that this negligence was not the cause
of the death of a workman by electrocution when the boom of a crane negligently touched
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Very much the same result is occasionally produced by an insistence that
the causal relation be shown to exist between that aspect of defendant's con-
duct which is wrongful and the injury.104 Under this approach the court asks
whether the same injury would have been caused if defendant's conduct had
been careful (or not violative of statute) but in all other respects had been
the same as it actually was. If a speeding automobile strikes a child, could
the event have been avoided by a driver who was proceeding at a reasonable
speed?105 If not, then the requisite causal connection does not exist. Now this
is in essence the same as an inquiry into whether the accident resulted from
the hazard (viz. lack of control) which made it negligent to drive too fast,
and so fell within the scope of the duty not to speed. And it is submitted that
the inquiry in the latter form is more meaningful and more likely to focus
attention on the real problem involved at least in terms of the fault principle
(e.g., Why should one not speed? What are the peculiar risks of speeding?
etc.). Moreover it is confusing to think hypothetically and hard to frame with
precision the terms of a condition contrary to fact. 0 6
Much of what has beeh said about the scope of common law duties is ap-
plicable also to duties imposed by statutes. Here, however, the emphasis is
upon the statutory purpose in determining the interests protected by the
the wires since "the crane operator's negligence was [not] the natural and probable con-
sequence of the lack of insulation and the sagging wires."). Cf. Lillie v. Thompson, 332
U.S. 459 (in which the test of foreseeability is properly applied to the issue of duty,
while the lower courts had been trapped in the quicksand of proximate cause).
104. But there are cases where causal relation exists between defendant's fault and
the injury, yet where liability will not be imposed. Thus in Gorris v. Scott, [1874]
L.R. 9 Exch. 125, defendants' wrongful failure to have pens for cattle on shipboard was
the cause in fact of their being washed overboard in a heavy sea. There was no liability,
however, since the statutory requirement was designed to protect the cattle only from
perils from contagious disease, a hazard which was not encountered and from which their
loss did not result. See Carpenter, Workable Rudes for Determining Proximate Cause,
20 CArnw. L. Rnv. 396, 408 (1932).
105. Such a test was used in Draxton v. Matzmark, 203 Minn. 161, 280 N.W. 288
(1938); Oster v. Chicago & A. Ry. Co., 256 S.W. 826 (Mo. App. 1923). A careful
exposition of the test discussed in the text is to be found in Carpenter, Workable Rules
for Determining Proximate Cause, 20 CALIF. L. REv. 396, 407 et seq. (1932). Car-
penter believes that the case put does not yield the same result if subjected to Dean
Green's analysis, id., at 412, but in this his reasoning seems faulty. Green's own analysis
of this particular case, however, leaves much to be desired. Green, Are There Dependable
Rules of Causation?, 77 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 601, 619 (1929).
106. In the case put, for example, if defendant has been driving more slowly before
the accident, he would not have been at the point of collision when the child was there,
so that there would have been no accident. Does that establish causal relation between
wrong and injury? Presumably not, but if not, that is because the prohibition against
speed is not for the purpose of keeping people from being at a certain place at a
certain time, but rather to prevent loss of control. Thus one is thrown back upon the
same inquiry into the scope of duty and the purpose of the rule of conduct in order to
frame intelligently the hypothesis needed for applying Carpenter's test. But why the
fiction and the contortions?
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duty and the evils sought to be prevented by legislative proscription of con-
duct, rather than upon what a reasonable person in defendant's place would
foresee. Because the statutory purpose doctrine was probably clearly and
expressly articulated at an earlier time than its counterpart, the limitation on
the scope of common law duties, there has been perhaps slightly less urge to
obfuscate the former inquiry by pursuing it in terms of proximate cause, but
this is done all too often even today. Thus where plaintiff's playmate pushed
him under a middle car of defendant's train which was passing at a speed in
violation of a local ordinance, the court admitted that the defendant was guilty
of negligence per se but found that the "intervening, independent, sole, proxi-
mate cause" of the injury was the other boy's push. 07 And where defendant
has parked his unlocked car on the street, with the key in the ignition switch
in violation of an ordinance, and the car is stolen by a person who, while
driving it, causes some damage, the owner has been held not liable on the
ground that the proximate cause of the injury was the action of the thief and
not the negligence of the owner.'0 8
(c) There is one kind of problem to which Pollock's test limiting proximate
consequences to those which are foreseeable will yield a different answer from
that given by the great weight of authority in this country and England. There
are cases where defendant has been negligent towards plaintiff or his property
(even under the restrictive view of the scope of duty) and where injury has
come through the very hazard that made the conduct negligent, but where
because the stage is set for it the extent of the injury passes all bounds of rea-
sonable anticipation. A milkman, for instance, negligently leaves a bottle
with a chipped lip and this scratches a housewife's hand as she takes it in.
All this is easily within the range of foresight. This particular housewife,
however, has a blood condition so that what to most women would be a
trivial scratch leads to blood poisoning and death.'0 9 Or a careless stevedore
drops a plank from hoisting tackle into the hold of a vessel. This might well
have damaged a member of the crew, or the ship, or cargo, but the plank
happens to ignite a spark which in turn ignites petrol vapor in the hold and
107. Lineberry v. North Carolina Ry. Co., 187 N.C. 786, 123 S.E. 1 (1924). Green
suggests that courts often use the 'proximate cause' doctrine "to get rid of the com-
pulsion of the statute." See Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 Tax.
L. Rrv. 621, 634-5, 764, 771 (1950); and Green, Proximate Cause in Connecticut
Negligence Law, 24 CONN. B. J. 24, 28-30 (1950). Cf. James, Statutory Standards
& Negligence in Accident Cases, 11 LA. L. Rav. 95, 121 (1950).
103. See, e.g., Wannebo v. Gates, 34 N.W. 2d 695 (Minn. 1948) and Note, 14
Mo. L. REv. 128 (1949), which make the error pointed out in the text. Cases are
collected in Annotations in 26 A.L.R. 912 (1923) and 158 A.L.R. 1374 (1945). Perhaps
the leading recent case contra is Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 321 U.S. 790 (1944). See also Note, 34 IowA L. Ray. 376 (1949), which treats
this problem and properly distinguishes the issues of cause and of duty.
109. Koehler v. Waukesha Milk Co., 190 Wis. 52, 208 N.W. 901 (1926).
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leads to.total destruction of the ship and cargo.110 In these and like cases the
courts generally hold defendant liable for the full extent of the injury without
regard to foreseeability. 111
This result has been attacked as one quite inconsistent with the prevailing
limitation on the scope of duty to interests and hazards which are foreseeable.
"[If] we once reject the idea that an act has a general quality of wrongfulness
where different persons are concerned, it would seem to follow logically that
we must also reject the idea that an act has a general quality of wrongfulness
where different consequences are concerned." 112 But the critcism stems from
too much insistence on mechanical consistency. There is no reason to apply
the restrictive foreseeability test to all problems just because it is applied to
some. There are strong reasons, both within the framework of fault and to
secure more effective compensation, for holding a wrongdoer liable for all
injuries he causes innocent men, and rejecting the foreseeability limitation alto-
gether.1 12a Counter considerations have prevailed to limit the risks of negligent
conduct as to persons (or interests) and types of hazard. Why should not
that much of a concession to one group of competing considerations be thought
enough? The choice is between emphasizing, on the one hand, the limited and
inconsequential nature of the fault, and on the other the very wide and serious
nature of the damage that calls for compensation. Is it not one of the judicial
functions to make a practical compromise where policies conflict? At any
rate here the line is drawn in fact and any deviation from it is not likely to be
in the direction of ruling out unforeseeable consequences of the kind being
discussed." 3 It should be noted that what is said under the present head applies
110. In re Polemis & Furness, Withy Co., [1921] .3 K.B. 560. Seavey suggests that
the foreseeability of some harm may explain this "famous but doubtful decision." Seavey,
Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 48 YALx L.J. 390, 403 (1939).
111. See authorities cited in notes 67-69 supra; and discussion by Carpenter, Work-
able Rules for Determining Proximate Cause, 20 CALIF. L. REv. 471, 477-484 (1932).
These cases should not be confused with those where the enxtraordinary result was pro-
duced by an intervening cause. See infra at pages 792-96.
112. Goodhart, The Unforeseeable Consequences of a Negligent Act, 39 YAE L.J.,
449, 465 (1930).
112a. In terms of fault it may be contended that any foreseeability limitation would
deprive an innocent victim of recovery for some damages caused in fact by a wrongdoer.
And obviously such a limitation shuts off compensation for some of the damages actually
suffered. Both of these consequences are unfortunate and must be counted as costs of a
foreseeability rule. In those fields of accident law where liability tends in practice to
distribute (rather than merely to shift) losses, the refusal to afford compensation for
actual damage is even more unfortunate. See James, Accident Liability Reconsidercd:
The Inpact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948); James & Dickinson,
Accident Proneness & Accident Law, 63 HLv. L. Rnv. 769, 777 et seq. (1950).
113. With regard to liability for unforeseeable consequences of what Prosser calls
"an impact upon the person of the plaintiff" (ToRTs 344 (1941)), compare the suggestion
by Burke, Rudes of Legal Cause in Negligence, 15 CALiF. L. REv. 1, 14 (1926) that a
distinction be made between cases in which "the first impingement of the defendant's
wrong" was unforeseeable (and liability would therefore not be imposed) and cases
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only where preexisting conditions and causes have already laid the train for
the surprisingly great extent of the damage which defendant's act sets off.
(d) Where there are forces intervening between defendant's act and plain-
tiff's injury courts generally tend to invoke the test of foreseeability. To the
eye of philosophy the distinction between intervening and preexisting causes
or conditions is tenuous if it exists at all. The philosophic determinist would
see no essential distinction between the gasoline vapor already in the hold of
the good ship Thrasyvoulos before the ill-starred stevedore dropped the plank,
and the hurricane or flood that arose after defendant's negligence left plaintiff's.
property vulnerably exposed to such a hazard, or for that matter the mal-
practice of the surgeon which caused gangrene to set in in plaintiff's wound.
To the determinist the stage for all these things was irrevocably set long before
any time that matters in this discussion. Of course the law generally-cer-
tainly the law of fault-does not accept any such philosophy. 114 But even those
who reject determinism can see that a wind or storm or flood was often in-
evitably in the making before defendant's negligence took place, though it
appeared on the immediate scene thereafter. Yet even such considerations are
generally too refined for the la-%'s rough-hewn tests. By and large external
forces will be regarded as intervening if they appear on the scene after de-
fendant had acted unless perhaps their pending inevitability dt the time of
defendant's negligent act or omission is made crystal clear. 15 And when a
new force (for which defendant is not responsible) "intervenes" in this crude
sense to bring about a result that defendant's negligence would not otherwise
have produced, defendant is generally held for that result only where the
intervening force was foreseeable." 6 As many cases put it, a new and unfore-
in which unforeseeable consequences followed a foreseeable "impingement" (and liability
would be imposed for the full damage suffered). This is perhaps only a rewording of
the generally accepted rule.
114. "The lawyer cannot afford to adventure himself with philosophers in the logical
and metaphysical controversies that beset the idea of cause." Po .ocx, TORTS 36 (11th
ed. 1920).
115. The definition offered by McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 Hv. L. REV. 149,
159 (1925) is clear and comprehensive: "An intervening force is a force which is
neither operating in the defendant's presence, nor at the place where the defendant's
act takes effect at the time of the defendant's act, but comes into effective operation at
or before the time of the damage." Cf. Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining
Proximate Cause, 20 CArm. L. REv. 471, 476 (1932).
116. This result was reached in Payne v. City of N.Y., 277 N.Y. 393, 14 N.E.2d
449 (1938) (cobblestone left lying in street thrown by wheel of passing car through
windshield of another car); Silver Falls Timber Co. v. Eastern & Western Lumber Co.,
149 Ore. 126, 40 P.2d 703 (1935) (fire carried by wind for several miles); Pease v.
Sinclair Ref. Co., 104 F.2d 183 (1939) (mislabeled chemical mixed with another chemical
caused explosion which would not have resulted had contents and container been properly
matched); Royal Indemnity Co. v. Midland Counties Pub. Ser. Corp., 42 Cal. App. 628,
183 Pac. 960 (1919) (horse entangled improperly insulated guy wire); Mize v. Rocky
Mtn. Bell Telephone Co., 38 Mont. 521, 100 Pac. 971 (1909) (telephone wire, negligently
allowed to break and fall across uninsulated power wire, received a charge of electricity
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seeable force breaks the causal chain. A better analysis is to regard the inter-
vening force as a risk or hazard and to ask whether its foreseeability was such
as to make defendant's act negligent with regard to it. It is better, in other
words, to inquire whether defendant's duty extends to such a risk as the
intervening force, because the question in this form focuses attention on a
more significant and less fictitious problem than that of cause.11 7 But the result
is likely to be the same. As we have seen there is probably some modern trend
towards greater use of the duty analysis but this is perhaps more observable
from the power wire which it carried ten miles to a wire fence which became charged
and electrocuted plaintiff's intestate when he touched it). Cf. Elder v. Lykens Vallen
Coal Co., 157 Pa. 490, 27 At. 545 (1893) (owner of mine depositing culm in stream
where ordinary current will carry it down to plaintiff's land is not relieved of liability
to plaintiff when the deposit in fact results from an extraordinary and unforeseeable flood)
A word about "exceptions" to this general rule (i.e., cases in which a defendant
is held liable for the consequences of an unforeseeable intervening force). Where a
carrier has been guilty of negligent delay in transporting goods, and while en route
they are destroyed by an act of God, some states hold the carrier liable. Bibb Broom
Corn Co. v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 94 Minn. 269, 102 N.W. 709 (1905); Green-Wheeler
Shoe Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 130 Iowa 123, 106 N.W. 498 (1906); Plotz v. Miller,
21 Ky. L. Rep. 257, 51 S.W. 176 (1899); Sunderland Bros. v. Chicago, etc. R. Co.,
89 Neb. 660, 131 N.W. 1047 (1911) ; Read v. Spaulding, 30 N.Y. 630, 86 Am. Dec. 426
(1864). Cf. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Miles, 92 Ark. 573, 123 S.W. 775, 124 S.W. 1043
(1909). It should be noted, however, that in many of the cases often cited for this
"exception" the courts have justified the imposition of liability on the ground that it
was foreseeable that the delay would increase the likelihood of some casualty overtaking
the goods. But, that the hazard was not foreseeable, see Prosser, The Minnesota Court
ots Proximate Catse, 21 MINx. L. Rr.v. 19, 51 (1937), discussing the Bibb Broom
case. Cases are collected in a note, 46 A.L.R. 302 (1927).
Carpenter lists several "exceptions where proximate cause exists although the
consequences result from unforeseeable intervening causes". Workable Rules for Deter-
mining Proximate Cause, 20 CALIF. L. REv. 471, 521-39 (1932). But in most, if not
all, of these "exceptions" the injuries resulting from the intervention of the new forces
were not altogether unforeseeable. Cf., for instance, Carpenter, Proximate Cause, 14
So. CALw. L. REv. 416, 440 (1941); and note 125, infra. The position of the Restatement
of Torts with respect to some of Carpenter's classes of intervening forces may be found
in §§ 443 and 444 (responses of animals and/or humans), § 445 (acts to avert threatened
danger), § 446 (acts to prevent deprivation of rights), and § 455 (acts of insane victim).
117. Carpenter, Workable Rides for Determining Proximate Cause, 20 CALIF. L. REV.
471, 510 (1932) singles out one class of cases (ejection by carriers of drunk persons
from their conveyances) where the courts occasionally do (and always should) talk
in terms of the scope of the defendant's duty, rather than in terms of the closeness of
the causal relation between the carrier's wrong and the injury suffered. He immediately
proceeds, however, to discuss in terms of cause another group of cases wherein the duty
analysis .would make the problem much clearer. Id. at 510-12. This latter group includes
Victory Sparkler & Specialty Co. v. Price, 146 Miss. 192, 111 So. 437, 50 A.L.R. 1462
(1927) (child died from effects of eating fireworks; manufacturer not liable) and
Central Georgia Ry. v. Price, 106 Ga. 176, 32 S.E. 77 (1898) (railroad not liable when
passenger, who had been lodged in hotel by railroad after it negligently carried her
past her destination was injured by explosion of lamp negligently furnished by hotel
proprietor).
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when the new force intervenes between defendant's act and any injury at all to
plaintiff than when the new force aggravates the extent of injuries concededly
caused by defendant's negligence, 11 though as a theoretical matter it might be
pretty hard to defend such a distinction.
(e) Where voluntary acts of responsible human beings intervene between
defendant's conduct and plaintiff's injury, the problem of foreseeability is the
same and courts generally are guided by the same test. If the likelihood of
the intervening act was one of the hazards that made defendant's conduct
negligent-that is if it was sufficiently foreseeable to have this effect-then
defendant will generally be liable for the consequences; otherwise he will
generally not be."19 Here, however, when voluntary acts of legally responsible
118. Compare Johnson v. Shattuck, 125 Conn. 60, 3 A.2d 229 (1938) (bicycle on
which plaintiff was "passenger" turned into path of defendant's automobile; court finds
that the foreseeability of the hazard of such a turn made defendant's conduct negligent)
with Wright v. Blakeslee, 102 Conn. 162, 128 Atl. 113 (1925) (injury resulting from
defendant's negligence aggravated by doctor's negligence; court finds damage attributable
to doctor's acts to have "proximately result[ed]" from the original negligence). 'And
cf. Mahoney v. Beatman, 110 Conn. 184, 147 Atl. 762, 66 A.L.R. 1121 (1929).
119. Examples could be multiplied infinitely, for there are thousands of reported
cases involving intervening human forces. As illustrative of their great variety see
RESTATEmmNT, ToRTs § 449 (1934) and illustrations, and: Byrne v. Wilson, 15 Ir. C.L.
R. 332 (1862) (owner of bus which was negligently driven into canal lock liable
for death of passenger who drowned when lock-keeper let water into the lock) ; Clark
v. Chambers, [1878] 3 Q.B.D. 327 (defendant, who had wrongfully barred a private
driveway with a spiked pole which was later moved by an unknown third person to an
adjacent footpath is liable to plaintiff lawfully using footpath who is injured by a spike
on the pole); Southern Ry. Co. v. Webb, 116 Ga. 152, 42 S.E. 395 (1902) (railroad
liable for death of passenger thrown from its car by a negligent jolt and killed while
lying unconscious on the tracks by train of another company); Brauer v. N.Y. Cent.
& H. R.R. Co., 91 N.J.L. 190, 103 Atl. 166 (1918) (railroad which struck plaintiff's
wagon at grade crossing liable also for loss of goods, which wagon was carrying, stolen
by people at scene of accident) ; Herman v. Markham Air Rifle Co., 258 Fed. 475 (E.D.
Mich. 1918) (manufacturer who sold loaded air rifle to wholesaler, who sold it to
retailer, liable to retailer's clerk shot in eye when prospective customer pulled trigger) ;
Shafer v. Keeley Ice Cream Co., 65 Utah 46, 234 Pac. 300 (1925) (float sponsored by
defendant in parade drew large disorderly crowd which knocked down and injured
plaintiff); Serviss v. Cloud, 121 Kan. 251, 246 Pac. 509 (1926) (operator of stone
quarry liable for death of boy as result of explosion of gunpowder he found in open,
unguarded cans in quarry); Mills v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 140 Ga. 181, 78 S.E.
816 (1913) (similar, as to explosive signalling torpedo negligently left on track by
defendant and picked up by boy who exploded it, fatally injuring his brother); and
as to explosives left accessible to children, see Note, 48 MicH. L. REV. 374 (1950)
(reviewing New York cases), and annotations, 43 A.L.R. 434 (1926); 49 A.L.R. 160
(1927); 100 A.L.R. 451 (1936).
Cf. Robinson v. Butler, 226 Minn. 491, 33 N.W. 2d 821 (1948) (driver of car
attempting to pass plaintiff's car not liable for injuries to plaintiff occurring when
frightened passenger in plaintiff's car grabbed steering wheel and caused car to veer
off left side of road; court, stressing RES TATEmENT § 442, finds the passenger's act to be
unforeseeable and extraordinary); Glassey v. Worcester Consol. St. Ry. Co., 185 Mass.
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persons are concerned other factors besides foreseeability sometimes come
into the picture as we shall see.' 20
So far as scope of duty (or as some courts put it, the relation of proximate
cause) is concerned, it should make no difference whether the intervening
actor is negligent 121 or intentional or criminal.12 2 Even criminal conduct by
others is often reasonably to be anticipated. After all, if I leave a borrowed
car on the streets of New York or Chicago with doors unlocked and key in
ignition, I am negligent (at least towards the owner) because of the very
likelihood of theft.'2 3 And if I lend a car to one known by me to be habitually
careless I am negligent precisely because of the likelihood of his negligent
operation of my car.'2 4 Again the importance of the factor of foreseeability
315, 70 N.E. 199 (1904) (railway not liable for acts of several boys in taking large,
empty wire reel from side of highway and rolling it down highway to where it hit
plaintiff's carriage and injured plaintiff).
120. See text infra at note 163.
121. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 447 (1934). See also Herman v. Markham Air Rifle
Co., supra note 119; Teasdale v. Beacon Oil Co., 266 Mass. 25, 164 N.E. 612 (1929)
(defendant liable for negligence of its filling station attendant who spilled gas on a car
and on plaintiff even though car owner was negligent in then cranking his car with
coil box uncovered, thus setting fire to the spilled gas); Cannon v. Lockhart Mills, 101
S.C. 59, 85 S.E. 233 (1915) (employer repairing water closet used by employees not
relieved of liability to employee, who fell through hole in closet floor, for failure to
fasten door properly, even though stick employer had used for this purpose had been
carelessly thrown aside by plaintiff's fellow-employee just before plaintiff's mishap).
122. REsTATEMENT, TORTS § 448 (1934). Illustrating the liability of the original
wrongdoer for foreseeable intervening intentional acts are Clark v. Chambers, smpra
note 119; Illidge v. Goodwin, 5 Car. & P. 190, 172 Eng. Rep. 934 (1831) (defendant
would be liable for damage done when his horse, negligently left in the street, backed
into a shop window, even though the horse did not move until a third person slapped it
or the shop owner "laid hold of its head"); Pearl v. Macauley, 6 App. Div. 70, 39
N.Y. Supp. 472 (2d Dep't 1896) (defendant's horse, negligently left unattended on
street, ran into and injured plaintiff when hit by rocks thrown at it by boys using slings).
With regard to intervening criminal acts see Brauer v. N.Y. Cent. & H.R.R. Co.,
.upra note 119; Hines v. Garrett, 131 Va. 125, 108 S.E. 690 (1921) (railroad which
negligently carried passenger past her destination and forced her to leave train at
notoriously dangerous neighborhood would be liable if she were raped while walking
home; plaintiff's judgment reversed on other grounds); McDonald v. Central School
District, 289 N.Y. 800, 47 N.E. 2d 50 (1943) (liability for failure to anticipate that
motorist might pass standing school bus) ; and see Note, 24 MiNir. L. REV. 666 (1940).
See cases collected in Note, 78 A.L.R. 471 (1932).
123. It is generally held that the bailee on a "loan" of goods (i.e., a bailment "for
the bailee's sole benefit") is under a duty to exercise the greatest care. DoBaE, BAM-
MENTS 34 (1914). The situation detailed in the text would certainly not be consistent
with the performance of this strict duty.
For cases in which the owner of a car, who has left it with the key in the ignition
switch, is being sued for damage inflicted by a thief who has driven it off, see note 108
supra, and Ostergard v. Frisch, 333 Ill. App. 359, 77 N.E. 2d 537 (1948) (reviewing the
cases).
124. Cf. Mitchell v. Churches, 119 Wash. 547, 206 Pac. 6 (1922), 36 HARv. L. REv.
110 (1922) (defendant loaned his car to one he knew would probably dive when
intoxicated).
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is not altered if the intervening act is that of plaintiff himself,125 nor is it if
that act is a negligent one. When I lent my car to the careless driver, one
of the risks that made me negligent was surely the chance that he might hurt
himself. If he is barred from recovery for such a hurt it is because of his
contributory fault, not for want of a causal connection or because he is beyond
the scope of my duty. 26  One other point should be noted here. There are
cases where defendant's wrong would not have caused plaintiff's injury if
some third person had taken intervening precautions which he was legally
bound to take. In such a case it might be said that the third person's negligent
omission intervened between defendant's wrong and the injury. Where
that is the case foreseeability is less likely to be used as a test of exclusion
of the original defendant's liability than where an affimative act intervenes. 27
125. See Serviss v. Cloud, supra note 119; Greenwood v. Jack, 175 Minn. 216, 220
N.W. 565 (1928) (defendant made defective repairs on plaintiff's car, so that when
plaintiff cranked it it backfired and broke his arm) ; Judy v. Doyle, 130 Va. 392, 108
S.E. 6 (1921) (owner of truck who parked it so that sharp blades it was carrying
projected out into the street liable to boy on bicycle who rode against them).
Where defendant's act threatens harm to the life or property of another, and a
person injures himself or another in acting to avert this harm, the original wrongdoer
will be liable for this latter damage. RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 445 (1934) ; and see dis-
cussion of cases by Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining Proxnimate Cause, 20
CALIF. L. REv. 471, 527-530 (1932) (injuries suffered by person attempting to extricate
himself from a situation which threatens harm because of defendant's negligence) ; and
id. at 535, nn. 424 and 425 (damage done to himself or to others by an intervenor who
is attempting to rescue other persons or property from peril created by the defendant) ;
Notes, 19 A.L.R. 4 (1922); 64 A.L.R. 515 (1929). The "rescue" doctrine applies
though neither human life nor the rescuer's own property are in peril as a result of
defendant's acts. See A.L.R. notes, cited supra, and Rushton v. Howle, 53 S.E.2d
768 (Ga. 1949).
It has been suggested that these cases involve an "abandonment of the rule of
foreseeability." Note, 29 COL. L. REv. 53, 58 (1929), but the authors agree with
Cardozo, J., that "danger invites rescue." Wagner v. International R. Co., 232 N.Y. 176,
180, 133 N.E. 437 (1921), and that the foreseeability of the rescue attempt brings the
rescuer within the scope of the defendant's duty.
126. See Nehrbass v. Home Indemnity Co., 37 F. Supp. 123 (D. La. 1941).
127. In the majority of cases the original wrongdoer is held liable for the ultimate
consequences of his act even though some third person, by performing his .duty, might
have prevented these consequences. See Bisby v. Thurber, 80 N.H. 411, 118 At. 99
(1922) (landlord of premises with roof and gutters so situated that rainwater flows
onto sidewalk and freezes is liable to person injured in fall on that ice notwithstanding
that tenant failed to observe covenant to repair) ; Wiley v. West Jersey R.R., 44 N.J.L.
247 (1882) (defendant liable for consequences of fire negligently caused by sparks from
its locomotive despite showing that tenant on whose land fire started had his attention
called to the fire and was under a duty to extinguish it) ; Sider v. General Electric Co.,
203 App. Div. 443, 197 N.Y. Supp. 98 <4th Dep't 1922) (manufacturer liable for placing
packing blocks, which caused short circuit, in transformer, although purchaser also was
negligent in putting transformer into operation without first inspecting it and testing it).
See also RESTATEmENT, ToRas § 452 (1934).
If a third person does attempt, but fails, to halt the consequences of the defendant's
act, the unsuccessful intervention does not relieve the defendant of liability. Mathis v.
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(f) Foreseeability does not mean that the precise hazard or the exact
consequences which were encountered should have been foreseen. Upon this
all are agreed, whether they regard foreseeability as relevant only to the duty
issue, or to questions of proximate cause as well. "[W]hen it is found that
a man ought to have foreseen in a general way consequences of a certain
kind, it will not avail him to say that he could not foresee the precise course
or the full extent of the consequences, being of that kind, which in fact hap-
pened."'128  In Hill v. Winsor,129 the defendants while operating their tug in
a negligent manner, bumped the fender of a bridge on which plaintiff was at
work causing the braces between certain piles to fall so that the piles sprang
together, catching plaintiff between them to his injury. The accident was a
most unusual one in the manner of its occurrence, yet the plaintiff was obviously
put in danger by the tug's negligence and the risk of his being struck by the
tug itself or injured somehow by the blow of the vessel against the structure
Granger Brick & Tile Co., 85 Wash. 634, 149 Pac. 3 (1915) (caps); Clark v. E.I. Du-
pont de N.P. Co., 94 Kan. 268, 146 Pac. 320 (1915) (high explosive) ; Henningsen v.
Markowitz, 132 Misc. 547, 230 N.Y. Supp. 313 (Sup. Ct. 1928) (air rifle); cf. Haverly v.
St. Line & S.R. Co., 135 Pa. 50, 19 AUt. 1013 (1890) (fire negligently caused by defendant
and not entirely extinguished by plaintiff's agent). The same rule applies even though it is
the defendant himself who intervenes after he has created the risk and attempts, by
reasonable means, to prevent it from taking effect: he will be liable for his original
wrong in creating the risk unless he is entirely successful in eliminating it. REsTATE-
MENT, TORTS §437 (1934).
There are some cases, however,-most of them are fairly old-which do exonerate
a defendant from liability for a consequence which another should have prevented.
Carter v. Towne, 103 Mass. 507 (1870) (defendant not liable to nine year old boy who
burned himself with dynamite he bought from defendant since boy's parents knew he
had bought the explosive and although they took it away from him they gave some of
it back to him on a previous occasion and had kept the remainder of it in a place where
he was able to obtain it at any time); Fowles v. Briggs, 116 Mich. 425, 74 N.W. 1046,
40 L.R.A. 528, 72 Am. St. Rep. 537 (1898) (defendant company which loaded its
lumber on a flat car and delivered the car to a railroad which failed in its duty to
inspect the load not liable to railroad worker killed when load shifted on the car);
Kurtz v. Detroit, T. & I.R. Co., 238 Mich. 239, 213 N.W. 169 (1927) (similar);
Howard v. Redden, 93 Conn. 604, 107 At. 509, 7 A.L.R. 198 (1919) (building contractor
not liable to passer-by killed by fall of weathered and rusted cornice because of passage
of some years since building completed and owner's supervening negligent failure to
inspect the premises).
128. Pollock, Liability for Conseqzwnces, 38 L. Q. Ray. 165, 167 (1922). RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS § 435 (1934) is in agreement.
The position stated here (which is pretty generally accepted) should not be confused
with the theory treated in the text at notes 97-98 supra (which is not generally accepted).
The theory suggested at notes 97-98 does not limit the scope of duty to the class of
persons or the type of risks reasonably to be foreseen-and it therefore may require the
imposition of liability for injuries to unforeseeable victims from unforeseeable hazards.
On the other hand the rule here under discussion does recognize this limitation of the
scope of duty owed, and requires only that a broad view be taken of the class of risks
or victims to be foreseen.
129. 118 Mass. 251 (1875).
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on which he was working were among the risks that made the operation of
the tug negligent. So defendant was held though probably no one could
have anticipated the actual train of events. The hazard, in other words, was
not defined narrowly as a risk that the piles would spring together when a
blow caused the braces between them to fall. 30 On the other hand the risk
or hazard to be perceived and guarded against cannot be defined too vaguely,
or the present restriction would lose all meaning and every defendant whose
acts were a cause in fact would be liable.
The example of the speeding car striking the child will illustrate this. If
the rule against excessive speed be viewed as simply designed to prevent auto-
mobile accidents or the striking of pedestrians, collision will be seen to have
arisen out of the breach of duty if a reasonable speed would not have brought
the car to the point of collision when the child was there. Yet if the child
darted out from behind a tree on a lonely road immediately in front of de-
fendant's automobile so that the accident would have been unavoidable then
even if defendant had been proceeding at a reasonable rate, most courts will
not hold him.1 1 The hazards peculiar to speed are those involved in dimin-
130. Other cases in which liability has been imposed as a result of the broad view
the court has taken of the class of risks or victims to be foreseen include: Figlar v. Gordon,
133 Conn. 577, 53 A. 2d 645 (1947) (bus company liable for negligence of driver who
raced motor of stationary bus, frightening pedestrian in front of bus, and causing her to
hurry into path of car illegally passing alongside of the bus). Osborne v. Van Dyke, 113
Iowa 558, 85 N.W. 784 (1901) (defendant, beating horse with stick, liable to plaintiff
whom he hit in the nose when his foot slipped); Bunting v. Hogsett, 139 Pa. 363, 21 At.
31 (1890) (defendant's railroad trackage, forming arc of circle, was intersected twice
within short distance by straight track of another railroad; defendant's engine negligently
ran into engine of other railroad at one crossing, was thrown into reverse by the impact,
went around the arc and smashed into another part of the same train of other railroad at
other crossing; defendant liable to passenger of other railroad injured by second impact) ;
Gibson v. Garcia, 216 P.2d 119 (Cal. App. 1950) (transit company, maintaining defective
pole along highway liable to pedestrian injured when pole, struck by negligent motorist,
fell on her) ; and see 65 C.J.S. 670 (Negligence § 109(b), which cites pertinent cases in
notes to the first paragraph, but which makes the error examined supra, at notes 99 and
103, in confusing the negligence (duty) issue with the cause issue with respect to applica-
tion of the foreseeability concept).
Carpenter does not place as much stress as do the authors here upon the "duty" ap-
proach to the problem of defendant's liability. 'Consequently he sees cases like those just
discussed as presenting no question of the foreseeability of the consequences but rather as
requiring the imposition of liability because there are no independent intervening forces
and causation is "direct". See Workable Rides for Determining Proximate Caitse, 20
CALIF. L. REv. 471, 473-475 (1932) and Proximate Cause, 14 So. CALIF. L. REv. 416, 435-
438 (1941). For an excellent criticism of the "directness" test see Seavey, Mr. Cardozo
and the Law of Torts, 48 YALE L.J. 390, 407 (1939). See also text, infra, at note 156.
131. See Howk v. Anderson, 218 Iowa 358, 253 N.W. 32 (1934); Burlie v. Stephens,
113 Wash. 182, 193 Pac. 684 (1920). See Wallace v. Suburban Ry. Co., 26 Ore. 174, 177,
37 Pac. 477, 478 (1894) ("If we assume.., that the child, without the fault or negligence
of the defendant, suddenly and unexpectedly appeared on the track immediately in front
of the car, we might conclude that her death was an unavoidable accident, and that the
rate of speed would be immaterial . . . ."). Cf. note 105, supra.
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ished control of the vehicle. The inquiry then into the nature of the risks
or hazards the foreseeability of which makes conduct negligent must be neither
too refined nor too coarse.
It is a matter of judgment in drawing the line. It is often not enough to
ask whether the rule of conduct violated is one to prevent traumatic bodily
injury, or the like; the nature of the hazards peculiar to the proscribed conduct
must be sought. But these must not be described in too specific and detailed
a way-it is enough that their general nature be indicated, and this will vary
from situation to situation. While it is negligent to speed on an ordinary
highway because of the risk of bringing about injury through diminished
control, it might be negligent to drive a car in some places crowded with
pedestrians at any speed or under any practicable degree of control because
of the likelihood of striking someone in any manner at all. 13 2  The inquiry is
but an aspect of that made under the issue of negligence (which includes
the sub-issues of standard of conduct, scope of duty, and breach) : was de-
fendant's conduct negligent in the light of all the risks to be foreseen by the
eye of prudence under the circumstances? For that reason it is futile and
confusing to repeat the inquiry under the heading of cause.
(g) Foreseeability is to be determined in the light of what a reasonable
man would have foreseen and is not limited to what defendant did in fact
foresee, though it includes that.133
(h) Foreseeability is not a term of precision, and there will not be any-
thing like uniformity in judgments of what is reasonably "within the risk"
foreseeably created by defendant's negligence. The decision-whether made
by court or jury-will often depend upon which circumstances in the case
are selected for emphasis. "It all depends upon what factors in the evidence
a court is willing to isolate and emphasize for the purpose of making this
The same principle applies in defining the scope of the plaintiff's duty. Berry v. Sugar
Notch, 191 Pa. 345, 43 Ati. 240 (1899) (driver of trolley injured by tree which fell on his
car as it was moving not barred by own contributory negligence even though speed of car
was "considerably in excess" of the legal limit; quite clearly the rule against excessive
speed was not meant to guard against all accidents of every sort-the court recognizes
that if the tree had already fallen and plaintiff's high rate of speed had made it impossible
for him to stop before striking it a different situation would be presented and plaintiff
might well be guilty of contributory negligence).
132. Cf. RESTATEFmT, ToRTs § 468, comment b (1934): "There are many acts and
omissions which are negligent because of their generally dangerous character and not be-
cause of their tendency to create any particular hazard or hazards." Cited with approval
in I-inch v. Elliott, 119 Conn. 207, 210, 175 Adt. 684 (1934). In the 1948 supplement to
the restatement this comment is deleted in order that § 468 might conform to the changed
analysis of the hazard problem in § 281, comment e. But in noting his reasons for the
changes in § 281, comment e, the reporter recognized that some conduct may be of a
"generally dangerous character."
133. James, The Qualities of the Reasonable Mai; in Negligence Cases, 16 Mo. L. REv.
1, 5-15 (1951).
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decision, which process in turn depends pretty much on what outcome the
court wishes to achieve or thinks to be politic. This factor in the judgment
process, in turn, is not usually a matter of conscious choice but may be a
function of the judge's accumulated experience in and observations of the
world he lives in."l4 It may also depend on what formula is chosen. In many
cases, from the point of view of one in the actor's shoes at the time of the
act or omission complained of, neither the exact chain of consequences nor
their precise nature and extent were probably to be actually anticipated. But
in these same cases if it is asked whether such occurrences and consequences
would have seemed extraordinary and out of the range of probability if they
had then been called to the actor's attention, they will often appear to be
more foreseeable. The formula chosen by the Restatement in its sections on
proximate cause, with its emphasis on what seems "extraordinary" in the
light of hindsight seems to abandon the foreseeability test. 35 But careful
analysis shows that it has not. "When we have hindsight nothing is extraor-
dinary, for we can see each step following inevitably on the other; when,
after an event, we say 'What a highly extraordinary result', we mean that a
person before the event could not have expected it."136 The proposed test
134. Gregory, Proximate Cause in Negligence-A Retreat from "Rationalization",
6 U. OF CHL L. Rv. 36, 50 (1938). As Prosser points out, this difficulty is greater when
it is asked whether a particular consequence is foreseeable enough to be "within the risk",
than when the inquiry is simply whether the aggregate of foreseeable consequences is
enough to make a given act or omission negligent. PRossER, ToRTs 343 (1941).
As a matter of trial technique it is recommended that on the plaintiff's side of the
case the facts be described as generally as is practicable, with the goal in mind of per-
suading court and jury that the unusual, freakish features of the case are unimportant
and that the "signficant" hazards (the ones which counsel has stressed) that were
actually encountered were really quite foreseeable by any reasonable defendant. Of course
defense counsel will stress the unusual details of the accident, which will in large measure
be unforeseeable, in the hope that a sufficiently particularized view of the hazards to be
foreseen will be taken by the triers of fact. This point is ably made by Morris, Proximate
Cause in Minnesota, 34 MiNN. L. REV. 185, 193, 198 (1950).
In interpreting duties imposed by statutes as broadly and generally as possible in
terms of hazards to be anticipated the courts are, of course, formulating doctrines which
are enormously favorable to plaintiffs. See, e.g., the discussion in Note, 34 IowA L. REv.
376 (1949), of cases in which the car owner, who has violated a statute by leaving his
car unlocked with the keys in the ignition switch, is being sued for injuries a thief has
caused while driving the car after stealing it. And see James, Statutory Standards &
Negligence in Accident Cases, 11 LA. L. REv. 95, 100, 113 (1950).
135. IESTATEmENT, ToRTs § 433(b) and comment e (1934). Statements of this
rule in the cases seem even plainer in their rejection of "foreseeability" as a test. See
Butts v. Anthis, 181 Okla. 276, 73 P.2d 843, 845 (1937) ("all the consequences which a
prudent and experienced man, fully acquainted with all the facts and circumstances which
in fact exist, whether they could have been ascertained by reasonable diligence or not,
would have thought at the time of the negligent act as reasonably possible to follow, if
they had been suggested to his mind." Emphasis supplied).




probably does, however, amount to an invitation to take a broad view towards
what is foreseeable. The same is probably true of the use of the word "nor-
mal" (rather than foreseeable, or probable) as the opposite of extraordinary.
It is too bad that this formula was not used in defining the negligence issue
where such considerations more appropriately belong.13 7
(i) The limitation of liability to consequences foreseeably "within the risk"
(with the exceptions noted above) is probably well enough adapted to an
accident law in transition from one based on fault to one affording compensa-
tion without regard to fault. This is so partly because it is vague and
imprecise enough to allow courts and juries a good deal of elasticity in
responding to trends which are only half articulated, without putting too
much strain on the logical framework. This elasticity also accommodates
the fact that the range of foreseeability may grow with increase of knowledge
about human behavior and about the propensities of animate and inanimate
things (including machines, atoms, and microbes).138 But beyond all this,
if the importance of fault continues fo wane, the test will lend itself readily
to becoming a rational one under the new dispensation-the inquiry whether
the consequence is within the risk incident to the particular act or omission
which is claimed to be negligent, may gradually be transformed into the
question whether it is within a risk incident to the enterprise or activity which
is to be charged for compensating it. 1
8sa
Other Proposed Tests:
There is a variety of other tests of the defendant's liability which have had
more or less currency and which find occasional favor today. Some of these
are more, and others less, restrictive than the prevailing modified foresee-
ability or risk test. Still others would substitute a formula which, after inviting
inquiry along one or more false scents, comes down in the last analysis to
nothing more than the foreseeability test.
I. Courts have infrequently confined liability within arbitrary limits of
time or space, restricting it far more than would a test in terms of foresee-
ability or risk. Thus the New York courts,139 and formerly those of Penn-
137. Cf. Seavey, Mr. Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 48 YALE L.J. 390, 408 (1939),
quoted supra, note 90.
138. Cf. McPartland v. State, 277 App. Div. 103, 98 N.Y.S.2d 665, 668 (1950),
where the point is made that if tort liability has been broadened it has not been from
any relaxation of standards of fault but has been the result of a change in "the range
and scope of the danger to be guarded against. The law of tort is more 'liberal'
precisely because experience shows more predictable casualties."
138a. Cf. The able and provocative development of a concept of "enterprise liability"
in EHENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951).
139. Ryan v. N.Y. Cent. R., 35 N.Y. 210 (1866) is the classic case. The rule was
departed from in O'Neill v. N. Y., 0. & W. R. R., 115 N.Y. 579, 22 N.E. 217 (189), but
restored emphatically in Hoffman v. King, 160 N.Y. 618, 55 N.E. 401 (1899). Even
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sylvania,1 40 limit liability for the spread of a fire to harm done to property
on the first premises to which the fire has spread (i.e., premises adjacent
to the defendant's, wherein the fire started, except where the fire has leapt
an intervening roadway or a vacant lot, nothing on which was ignited). 141
This rule has been quite properly rejected in every other jurisdiction.
1 42
II. Going to the other extreme, so far as predictability is concerned, Edger-
ton has proposed that an "average sense of justice" be the yardstick and that a
"justly attachable cause" be deemed a proximate cause.143 A just decision is
one which is "socially advantageous"--which balances "competing individual
and social interests," favoring those which are most important. 144 Each deci-
sion serves the double function of achieving a just balance of interests in the
particular case and where liability is imposed, of discouraging unsocial conduct
of a similar nature in the future. 1 45 In each of its functions this test is open
to criticism. Insofar as it is intended to have a deterrent effect it is, like all
other tests similarly purposed, based on a misconception, for most torts are
unintentional or are committed in disregard or ignorance of legal conse-
quences.' 46 The test is hardly more helpful in reaching decisions in individual
cases. A sense of justice is of course essential in any decision-making process,
for liability should never be imposed unfairly. But in most cases there is
serious dispute as to the justice of any given result. In such cases it may be
Cardozo gave support to this rule. See Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 224
N.Y. 47, 120 N.E. 86, 13 A.L.R. 875 (1918). The rule does not, however, limit the
recovery by a single owner to damages for the first structure ignited on his land. Davies
v. Delaware, L. & W. Ry., 215 N.Y. 181, 109 N.E. 95 (1915).
140. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Kerr, 62 Pa. 353, 1 Am. Rep. 431 (1870), repudiated
in Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hope, 80 Pa. 373, 21 Am. Rep. 100 (1876).
141. See House Corp. v. Sun Oil Co., 258 N.Y. 462, 180 N.E. 172 (1932).
142. Smith v. London & S. W. Ry., L.R. 6 C.P. 14 (1870); Kuhn v. Jewett, 32
N.J. Eq. 647 (1880); Phillips v. Durham & C.R., 138 N.C. 12, 50 S.E. 462 (1905);
Silver Falls Timber Co. v. Eastern & W. Lumber Co., 149 Ore. 126, 40 P. 2d 703 (1935).
In New York the harshness of the arbitrary rule has led to modifying legislation.
For example, see the sections of the state Conservation Law extending liability in cases
of "forest fires" damaging "forest land," discussed in Nicoll v. L. I. R. R., 232 App.
Div. 435, 250 N. Y. Supp. 366 (2d Dep't 1931).
All of the foregoing were fire cases, but an arbitrary distinction based on time or
space would have no greater justification in any other class of cases, "the defendant who
sets a bomb which explodes ten years later, or mails a box of poisoned chocolates from
California to Delaware, has caused the result and should obviously bear the consequences."
PRossan, TORTS 349 (1941), citing cases. Even the New York rule has not been
adopted in that state except in fire cases.
143. Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. oF PA. L. REv. 210, 343 (1924).
144. Id. at 373.
145. Id. at 347, 355, 356, 361, 367.
146. The case would be rare indeed where a possible tort-feasor would even know
about the intricacies of proximate cause. And if he did, it would be speculative how
much of a part in accident prevention is played by the possibility of civil liability. See
James, Accidental Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YA.M
L.J. 549, 558 (1948).
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helpful to have this underlying consideration articulated, but it should not be
expected that a mere statement of the goal will assure its attainment.147 Justice,
as a goal, is too abstract to be self-applying and self-evident in particular cases.
The process of adapting and translating the abstract goal to particular situa-
tions may take one of two forms. On one hand, all hope may be abandoned
of categorizing or systematizing human experience. Edgerton appears to pre-
fer this solution for he would shun fixed rules and formulae and would instead
permit the jury to consider any circumstances thought to be pertinent to impose
liability upon "justly attachable" causes on grounds of fairness and social ad-
vantage.148 On the other hand, the quest may be pursued for more or less
definite rules, adapted from decisions in fairly discernable groups of cases with
similar fact situations.149 An advantage of the latter treatment is to be found
in the greater predictability of decision it affords. 1 0
III. Though it may be undesirable to entrust the jury with almost complete
discretion in imposing liability, a single rule or formula which attempts to
reduce all the cases to a simple pattern may not be any more desirable. For
example, the division of antecedent forces into conditions (which merely made
possible the harm, and for which there is no liability) and causes (upon which
liability will be imposed) 1r1 is of deceptive simplicity and certainty. It may be
convenient for a commentator to be able to group those cases in which no
liability was imposed under the heading of "condition," and to say that the
courts have found the defendant's conduct to be a "cause" in all cases in which
147. Edgerton's fear is that the ultimate goal, justice, is being lost sight of in the
maze of rigid rules of causation. His effort to restore proper perspective makes justice
the only standard by which to judge. His test is thus little better than a question with
regard to its ability to assure an answer, for it forecloses from all consideration the use
of established intermediate reasoning aids and standards.
148. 72 U. OF PA. L. REv. at 373. This course may be characterized as little more
than judicial coin-flipping. For a criticism of this improper delegation of functions to an
unfit body, see McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARv. L. REv. 149, 194 et. seq. (1924).
149. It may well be argued that the likelihood of achieving more than haphazard
justice is far greater under this latter process. All of the precedent relied upon itself
reflects, at least in part, a desire to deal justly with litigants, and as each rule is applied,
if injustice results in any distinguishable group of situations, a modification of the rule
may be expected.
On the other hand, of course, the persistence of some rules is more a matter of inertia
and professional conservatism than a proof that the rule has met the pragmatic test.
This is but an aspect of an age-old controversy. Contrast for example the boast of
Equity that it furnished needed flexibility with the reproach that the measure of equity
was the variable measure of the Chancellor's foot.
150. Of course rules cannot afford a high degree of certainty-especially those couched
in such vague terms as foreseeability. Yet even such rules give more of a guide for
prophesy than Edgerton's negation of all subsidiary rules.
151. White v. Lang, 128 Mass. 598, 35 Am. Rep. 402 (1880); Guilfoile v. Smith,
95 Conn. 442, 111 Atl. 593 (1920); Kryger v. Panaszy, 123 Conn. 353, 196 Aft. 795
(1937), discussed in Green, Proximate Cause it Connecticut Negligence Law, 24 GoNx.
B. J. 24, 33 (1950).
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that defendant was held liable. But as an aid in reaching decisions in particular
cases the dichotomy is worse than useless.152 It can only be related to actual
fact situations if all active forces are denominated "causes" and all passive situ-
ations attributable to the defendant are classed as "conditions." But even if a
valid, definitive distinction between active and passive antecedents could be
made in every case,153 it would often not indicate the proper decision of the
proximate cause question. 1 4 The distinction between cause and condition is
only determinative in a concrete case when modified by exceptions in terms of
the class of risks to be anticipated or the foreseeability of intervention of an in-
juring force-and since, as we have seen, such "exceptions" in themselves con-
stitute an adequate test it would seem far better to omit altogether any
dependence upon the "cause-condition" formula. Most jurisdictions do not
even mention it, and many others expressly repudiate it.1 5
IV. Considerably wider acceptance has been achieved by a formula which
differentiates the "direct" from the "indirect" consequences of an act. Liability
is imposed for all consequences which follow, without the intervention of new
152. "[T]he alleged distinction does not solve the question of the existence of causal
relation. It is simply a restatement of the original problem in a different form of words."
Smith, Legal Cause it Actions of Tort, 25 HAuv. L. Rxv. 103, 110 (1914). Cf. 1 JAGGARD,
TORTS 64 (1895), quoted by Smith: "The distinction between cause and condition would
be valuable if there were any definite standard for determining what is a cause and
what is a condition. The only standard by which this can be determined is the same
as that which determines a proximate from a remote cause.. . . Accordingly, 'condition'
.*. while affording a convenient verbal distinction, is, in use, likely to mislead thinkers
into a conviction that they have something which they have not."
153. Cf. McNiece & Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58 YArE L.J. 1272 (1949).
154. Defendants are frequently held liable for having created a situation which had
become a passive condition long before the accident. See, e.g., Pyke v. Jamestown, 15
N.D. 157, 107 N.W. 359 (1906) (plaintiff fell into hole in sidewalk which defendant
city was negligent in digging or not repairing) ; Page v. Bucksport, 64 Me. 51 (1874)
(defendant town, negligent in allowing bridge to become defective, is liable to man
injured while trying to extricate horse which broke through bridge); Teasdale v.
Beacon Oil Co., 266 Mass. 25, 164 N.E. 612 (1929) (plaintiff burned when gasoline
spilled on and around car by defendant's employee was accidentally ignited by a third
person) ; Johnson v. Kosmos Portland Cement Co., 64 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1933) (barge
owner permitted gases to remain in barge and explosion caused by lightning followed) ;
Quaker Oats Co. v. Grice, 195 Fed. 441 (2d Cir. 1912) (owner of grinding mill permitted
it to become filled with dust which was exploded).
155. See, e.g., Kinderavitch v. Palmer, 127 Conn. 85, 95, 15 A.2d 83 (1940) ("Properly
understood, to say that conduct is a condition rather than a cause of an accident means
no more than that it is a remote and not a proximate cause."). But a handful of state
courts still pays lip service to the useless rubric. See Briske v. Burnham, 379 Ill. 193, 39
N.E. 2d 976, 979 (1942); Stewart v. Kroger Grocery, 198 Miss. 371, 21 So. 2d 912, 914
(1945) ; Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Butler, 190 Okla. 393, 124 P.2d 397, 399 (1942) ;
Atchison v. Texas & P. Ry., 143 Tex. 466, 186 S.W. 2d 228, 232 (1945) and even an
occasional periodical treats the test as though it were a matter of some substance. See
Note, 21 B.U.L. REv. 190, 191 (1941).
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external forces, in unbroken natural sequence from the original act.1r6 At first
glance this test presents merely a problem of semantics, for its most essential
ingredient is an acceptable definition of a "new, external, intervening force."'' r
But though sufficiently generalized definitions are frequently proposed the test
does not become a workable one unless the court or jury is willing to refuse to
go beyond a certain point in looking for new active forces.151 Therefore, until
such time as a court indicates the preciseness and thoroughness with which it
intends to search for such forces this test must produce a high degree of un-
certainty of decisions.
Even the most enthusiastic adherents to the direct-indirect test would not
press it to its logically symmetrical extreme by excusing from liability all de-
fendants whose acts only indirectly caused the plaintiff's injuries.",' But what
they fail to realize 160 is that not even all direct causes are "proximate," for
there may be no liability even for the direct consequences of an act if the
defendant was not under a duty to protect the plaintiff from the type of hazard
encountered. 61
156. See Christianson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 67 Minn. 94, 69 N.W. 640, 641 (1890);
Slater v. Baker, 261 Mass. 424, 158 N.E. 778 (1927); Wright v. Powers, 238 Ky. 572,
38 S.W. 2d 465, 466 (1931); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Jones, 138 Fla. 746, 190 So. 26, 27
(1939) ; Anderson v. Johnson, 208 Minn. 373, 294 N.W. 224, 227 (1940) ; and cases in
5th DECENNIAL DIGEST, Negligence § 56 (1.6 and 1.7).
For discussions which more or less support this test see Beale, The Proximate Col-
sequences of an Act, 33 HAnv. L. REv. 633 (1920); McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39
HRv. L. REv. 149 (1925); Carpenter, Workable Rides for Determining Proximate
Cause, 20 CAraF. L. REv. III, 471, 473-75 (1932) and Proximate Cause, Part V, 15 So.
CAr. L. REv. 304, 318, 321 (1942), discussed in note 130 supra.
The distinction between direct and indirect causes may be the illegitimate offspring
of the obsolete distinction between trespass and case. However, at common law recovery
was allowed for indirect as well as direct consequences provided the plaintiff properly
labelled and pleaded his cause of action.
157. See note 115 supra.
158. "The entire assumption that the physiological disturbances which follow from a
wound are part of the defendant's direct force rests upon a refusal to analyze the physio-
logical processes. It is necessary to note here that obvious intervening forces, such as a
man's eating, may often be neglected for practical purposes in analyzing a case. Eating
bacteria is so foreseeable that it would not be an isolating force, and so the question of
classification as direct causation or some other type may be ignored. It must be obvious,
however, that the limits of direct causation are not sharply defined." McLaughlin,
Proximate Cause, 39 HAnv. L. REV. 149, 165 (1925).
159. Generally the foreseeability test is invoked. See, e.g., Carpenter, Proximate
Cause V, 15 So. CALIF. L. Rmv. 304, 321 (1942).
160. Or, prefer to ignore (see last paragraph of note 130 supra). Cf. PRossER, TorTs
348 (1941), which notes the arbitrariness of the distinction but finds it justifiable on
grounds of practicality.
161. The classic example is Mrs. Palsgraf's case wherein the causal relation was
just as direct as in the Polemis case. See also Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Neg-
ligence Law, 28 TFN. L. REv. 621, 640 (1950). Moreover where a speeding car hits a
child which darts into its path, defendant's wrong is surely in a sense a direct cause of the
mishap. And if it be objected that in another sense this is not so, we are driven to ex-
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In the light of the obstacles in the way of making this test more definitive and
predictable, the inaccurate decisions which would result from attempts to apply
it in its full import in either direction, and the problems of language arising
from the use of "directness" as the touchstone of liability,162 perhaps it would
be better to consign the direct-indirect test to the scrap heap.
V. Another restrictive test, emphasizing chiefly the chronology of interven-
ing human acts, holds only the last wrongdoer liable for an injury produced by
the combined effect of successive acts of wrongdoing.163 This rule may have
stemmed in part from a notion (which once had some currency)1 64 that the
law fulfilled its function if it offered one legally liable defendant to a plaintiff,
so that it was superfluous and in some peculiar way uneconomical to offer
more. The rule may also be traceable to the reluctance of courts to admit that
subsequent unlawful action may be expectable or that earlier wrongdoers should
be responsible for such action.165 At any rate, whatever the reason, the last
amining the risks which make speeding negligent in order to draw the line between the
two senses. Cf. text at note 104 supra. See also RESTATENT, TORTS § 430, comment b
(1934).
Seavey concludes: "[I]f directness is meant to connote the comparative absence of ex-
ternal forces not set in motion by the defendant, it is not responsive to the decisions either
as a test of inclusion or exclusion." Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts,
4S YALE L.J. 390, 407 (1939).
162. The semantic problem was given fuller treatment by Bauer, Confusion of the
Terms "Proximate" & "Direct", 11 NoTRE DAmE LAw. 395 (1936). See also PRossER,
ToRTs 347, n.88 (1941).
163. WHARTox, NEGLIGENCE § 134 (1st ed. 1874); Eldredge, Culpable Intervention
as Superseding Cause, 86 U. oF PA. L. REv. 121, 124 (1937). See also In re Michigan
S. S. Co., 133 Fed. 577, 579 (N.D. Calif. 1904) ("negligence 'cannot ordinarily be said to
be the proximate cause of an injury when the negligence of another independent human
agency has intervened and directly inflicted injury."' citing 16 Am. & ENG. ENcY. 446
(1st ed.)).
164. Bohlen mentions this as a source of the rule: Contributory Negligence, 21 HARv.
L. Rmr. 232, 238 (1908). See also the comment by Blackstone quoted by WHARToN,
NEGLIGENCE § 139 (1st ed. 1874) : "Three actions for a single act .... nay, it may be
extended ad infinitum."
165. WHARTON, NEGLIGECE § 138 (1st ed. 1874); Chancey v. Norfolk & W. Ry.
Co., 174 N.C. 351, 93 S.E. 834 (1917) (assault and robbery in overcrowded, unlit rail-
road car) ; Andrews v. Kinsel, 114 Ga. 390, 40 S.E. 300 (1901) (robbery by unidentified
person who gained entry through window and partition negligently left open by de-
fendant).
Holmes strongly urged the unforeseeability of subsequent unlawful acts as the true
ground of many, diverse types of tort decisions. See HOLMEs-PoLLocx Lmr-rs 34-39
(Howe ed. 1941) and discussion in text and notes 167, 172 infra.
Nowadays this unrealistic position is almost universally discredited. Cf., however
Daigrenpont v. Teche Greyhound Lines, 189 Ga. 601, 7 S.E.2d 174, 178 (1940) and
Singleton Abbey v. Paludina [1927] A.C. 16, 76 U. oF PA. L. REV. 720 (1928). As a
general proposition subsequent negligent illegal or criminal actions may often be fore-
seeable, the only remaining issue being whether they were foreseeable in the instant case.
See text and cases at note 122 supra.
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wrongdoer rule has been used infrequently and capriciously to limit liability
throughout the history of negligence law.
The sporadic instances of such use have probably been confined to a few
situations where the law, for reasons of real or supposed policy, has disfavored
a type of claim or defense which it nevertheless allows.'0 6 Thus recovery has
been denied in a suit against a municipality for a highway defect if the accident
was also contributed to by the wrongful act of a third person.167 This limitation
has found favor in the same class of cases in Pennsylvania also. 0 s In nearly
all states the doctrine of last clear chance, a variant of the last wrongdoer rule,
is employed as a limitation on the disfavored defense of plaintiff's contributory
negligence.169 Occasionally, the defense of contributory negligence itself has
been called merely an application of the last wrongdoer rule. 170 And a harsh,
indefensible doctrine has recently been fashioned by a few courts to exonerate
an illegally parked vehicle from liability, even to innocent victims, wherever
the moving driver saw the parked vehicle in time to avoid hitting it.' 71 The
166. See note 87 supra, listing some of the so-called "favored" enterprises and dis-
favored actions and defenses.
167. Hayes v. Hyde Park, 153 Mass. 514, 27 N.E. 522, 12 L.R.A. 249 (1891) (opinion
by Holmes) ; Mahogany v. Ward, 16 R.I. 479, 17 Atl. 860 (1889). The liability of a
municipality in this situation springs solely from statute and courts tend to construe these
statutes with an especially tender regard for the defendants. For example, a few
courts have required that the street defect be the "sole" cause of the injury. See Bar-
tram v. Town of Sharon, 71 Conn. 686, 43 Atl. 143, 46 L.R.A. 144, 71 Am. St. Rep. 225
(1899). Holmes did not feel it was necessary to resort to a rule of strict construction to
exonerate the town, however; in the Hayes case, supra, the decision rests upon the last
wrongdoer rule as a general principle. (See 153 Mass. at 515-16; HOL ES-POLLOCK
Lmrrs 38 (Howe ed. 1941)). Cf. also Milostan v. City of Chicago, 148 111. App. 540
(1909) (wilful act of third party cannot combine with mere negligent omission as proxi.
mate cause).
168. Stone v. Philadelphia, 302 Pa. 340, 153 At. 550 (1930) ; Hoffman v. McKeesport,
303 Pa. 348, 154 At. 925 (1931). Cf. Maguire v. Doughty, 326 Pa. 122, 127, 191 At1. 348
(1937) (last wrongdoer rule applied to exonerate traction company). Eldredge has docu-
mented the aberrational nature of these decisions even as regards Pennsylvania precedent
in Culpable Intervention as Superseding Cause, 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 121 (1937).
Some cases which have been put on this ground would probably be decided as they
were on any ground. Alexander v. New Castle, 115 Ind. 51, 17 S.E. 200 (1888) (plain-
tiff injured when third person deliberately threw him into excavation negligently left
unguarded by city. This was scarcely the type of risk that makes a highway defect
negligent).
169. James, Last Clear Chance, A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704 (1938).
Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HARv. L. REv. 233, 238 (1908), was probably the
first to characterize this doctrine as an application of the last wrongdoer rule.
170. Although such an explanation would by no means account for many of the
situations in which the doctrine is daily applied. Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21
HA v. L. Rav. 233 (1908); James, Last Clear Chance, A Transitioml Doctrine, 47
YALE L.J. 704, nn. 2-4 (1938).
171. Of course if the only negligence of the parked vehicle is the failure to set out
proper signals, that failure is not a cause in fact of being hit by a driver who saw the
obstruction anyway. Jilka v. National Mut. Cas. Co., 152 Kan. 537, 106 P.2d 665
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principle has also been used outside of the field of negligence as, e.g., to limit
liability of defendants in disfavored actions for defamation.'7 2
The last wrongdoer rule is subject to criticism wherever it is invoked. It
reflects no vital modem policy, but only earlier mechanistic notions.173 And it
is irreconcilable with large bodies of existing case law. The last wrongdoer
is not always held liable for damage which ensues ;174 on the other hand a
wrongdoer who is not closest in point of time to the plaintiff's injury is often
held liable. 1 75 At best the last wrongdoer test yields a "correct" result only
by chance.
VI. Jeremiah Smith suggested that liability be limited to those cases in
which the defendant's tort was "a substantial factor in producing the damage
complained of."'176 This "test" for limiting liability attracted no following in
the courts, and only scant attention from commentators, until the Restatement
of Torts adopted it in 1934.177 Since that time its popularity has greatly in-
creased and today more than a dozen states at least pay lip service to it.
178
(1940). But if the vehicle is standing on a part of the highway where it is forbidden
to park, the purpose of the prohibition is surely in part to cut down the chance of being
hit by confused and stupid drivers, as well as by inattentive ones. Yet a few courts
have evoked the last wrongdoer rule from the shades of the past to insulate the parked
vehicle's operator or owner from liability wherever the overtaking driver saw the ob-
struction when he still could have stopped. Medred v. Doolittle, 220 Minn. 352, 19
NAV.2d 788 (1945); Kline v. Mayer, 325 Pa. 357, 191 Atl. 43 (1937) (perhaps no
different from the Jilka case, supra, but uses broader language). Some courts have
even used this kind of reasoning where the overtaking driver negligently failed to see
the obstruction. Hubbard v. Murray, 173 Va. 448, 3 S.E.2d 397 (1939); Hataway v.
F. Strauss & Son, 158 So. 408 (La. App. 1935); cf. Jaggers v. Southeastern G. L. Co.
34 F. Supp. 667 (M.D. Tenn. 1940). Cases where the accident would have happened
anyway even if defendant's car had been left so as to leave the legal clearance are,
of course, distinguishable. Schultz v. Brogan, 251 Wis. 390, 29 N.W.2d 719 (1947);
Walton v. Blauert, 256 Wis. 125, 40 N.W.2d 545 (1949).
The weight of authority, however, quite properly allows the innocent victim to hold
both the one who parked the stationary vehicle and the driver who negligently ran
into him. Kieper v. Pacific G. &. E. Co., 36 Cal. App. 362, 172 Pac. 180 (1918); cases
collected in Notes, 111 A.L.R 412 (1937); 131 A.L.R. 562, 605 (1941).
172. "The general rule, that a man is not liable for a third person's actionable and
unauthorized repetition of his slander, is settled." Holmes, J., in Elmer v. Fessenden,
151 Mass. 359, 362, 24 N.E. 208, 209 (1889). Cf. Vicar v. Wilcocks, 8 East 1 (1806)
(plaintiff could not recover damages from his slanderer for his wrongful discharge by
his employer in consequence of the slander).
173. See Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HAv. L. REv. 231, 236 (1908); 8
RoLDswvORTH, I-hsToRY oF ENrOiSH[ LAW 460 (2d ed. 1931). Even in last clear chance
cases the formula in no way expresses a vital modern policy though it has been a vehicle
for such a policy. James, Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J.
704 (1938).
174. He will be so held only where he is under a duty with respect to the risk actually
encountered. See text at note 99 supra.
175. HARPER, LAw oF ToRTs §§ 123, 214 (1931); PRossFR, ToRTs 357 (1941). See
notes 121-124 supra.
176. Smith, Legal Cause it; Actions of Tort, 25 HIL-v. L. REv. 103, 303, 309 (1912).
177. RE sTATEmNT, ToRTs §§ 431, 433, 435 (1934) and text, infra, at notes 179 et seq.
178. And in some jurisdictions "substantial factor" has become the only acceptable
formula. See cases cited in note 192 infra.
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The distinction between substantial factors and others may perhaps be
significant and useful in practically fixing the limits of the cause-in-fact rela-
tion between defendant's wrong and plaintiff's damage. 17 9 But as Smith and
originally the Restatement presented the test, it appeared to go further than
this and to be, in effect, a test of proximate cause. Thus the Restatement pro-
vides that negligence is a legal cause of harm if it is a substantial factor in
bringing that harm about, and if there is no rule of law which relieves the actor
from liability because of the way the harm was brought about.lso The next
section, 432, declares in effect that conduct cannot be a substantial factor in
producing harm miless it is a cause in fact of the harm. Then Section 433
proceeds to list factors which may be important in determining whether negli-
gence is a substantial factor in causing harm, and among these factors was
originally put the curious foreseeability-of-hindsight test discussed above.18 '
But as we have seen182 foreseeability has no place at all in solving the cause in
fact problem. Rather it represents a limitation which would relieve a defendant,
for reasons of policy, from liability for harm which he in fact caused. The
Institute has recognized this and in 1948, Section 433 was amended to delete
the foreseeability-of-hindsight clause.' 83 The amendment is wise.'8 4 "Sub-
179. Yet if the limitations on scope of duty be observed (viz., that the harm must come
to the class of interests foreseeably jeopardized, from a risk the likelihood of which made
defendant's conduct negligent) it may be hard to imagine a negligent act which is at the
same time a necessary antecedent of the harm and yet not a substantial factor in producing
it. See Carpenter, Proximate Cause, 14 So. CALiF. L. REv. 416, 431-4 (1941). Perhaps
the substantial factor formula may be helpful in deciding whether defendant's wrong
effectively contributed to plaintiff's harm where another cause would have brought about
that harm anyway. See page 774 supra; RESTATE ENT, ToRTs § 432 (2) (1934).
180. RFSTATEMENT, TORTS, § 431 (1934).
181. At notes 135, 136 spra. The test in question was phrased thus: "whether after
the event and looking back from the harm to the actor's negligent conduct it appeared
highly extraordinary that it should have brought about the harm."
182. At page 787 supra.
183. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs 733 (Supp. 1948). As the new added comment makes
clear, the substantial factor formula is applicable only to the cause in fact question. "It
is completely faulty analysis" and "is confusing the question of policy with the question
of fact," to use the criterion of foreseeability (the "highly extraordinary" formula) in
determining such a question. The formula is not abandoned in the Supplement, but is
transferred to § 435 where it is presented as a rule of policy which relieves the actor
from liability for harm which he has, in fact, caused.
Perhaps it was always the intent of the Institute that "substantial factor" be a test
only of cause in fact, and some courts have so understood it. Goudy v. State, 35 So.
308 (Mliss. 1948) ; Schultz v. Brogan, 251 Wis. 390, 29 N.W.2d 719 (1947). But other
courts have assimilated the phrase to all the hopeless confusion that can surround the
notion of "proximate cause." E.g., Hayes Freight Lines v. Wilson, 226 Ind. 1, 77 N.E.2d
580 (1948).
184. Though it does not go far enough. Surely clarity of thought would have been
aided greatly had'the Institute had the courage of the conviction which it now expresses
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stantial factor" as a test of proximate cause is no more helpful than proximate
cause itself. If defendant's wrong is a substantial cause in fact of plaintiff's
harm, recovery should not be denied because of any further consideration of
cause. To be sure recovery may be prevented by other kinds of considerations
such as limitations on the scope of duty. But the term "substantial factor" is
no more appropriate to describe these considerations than is any of the other
cause formulas treated above.'
8 5
VII. Language in vogue in different states. Virtually every one of the
tests discussed above has had some currency among the courts of the different
states, both in charges to the jury and in judicial opinions. And many states
may be said to "adopt" one "rule" at one time, and another "rule" at another
time. The fact is that in a great number of situations it makes very little
difference what test is used. 86 In many cases, for example, there is no
question of intervening cause and the very popular direct cause formula 8 7
is appropriate enough. Where, however, there is an intervening cause or the
like, an instruction in terms of direct cause may be erroneous, 88 unless it
is coupled with an adequate guide for telling when there may still be liability
despite such interventions.' l Reference to such a work as Words and
Phrases 190 will show that the most generally used expressions today are
those involving some form of the directness test; those associated with fore-
seeability (natural and probable consequences, 191 and the like) ; and the "sub-
stantial factor" test.19 2 The "justly attachable cause" formula has had little
(see new comment ee to § 281 on p. 651 of the 1948 Supplement) that "a completely
accurate analysis of the hazard element in negligence would require the material on
superseding cause in Chapter 16 to be placed in [the Negligence] chapter." Indeed all
of the chapter on cause (except for the cause in fact provision) should have been deleted.
Cf. Green, The Torts Restatement, 29 Ii1. L. REv. 582, 602 et seq. (1935).
185. Id., n. 184.
186. And in such situations it is obvious, from even cursory reading of the cases,
that many courts indulge in random, standard definitions of proximate cause merely as
a "warm-up" exercise; formulas are collected indiscriminately and then often accorded
no further consideration (by relating them to the merits of the case, and the like).
See, e.g., Berg v. New York C. P. Co., 391 Ill. 52, 62 N.E.2d 676 (1945) ; Greiving v.
La Plante, 156 Kan. 196, 131 P.2d 898 (1943).
187. A typical statement of this formula may be found in Blanton v. Curry, 20 Cal.2d
793, 805, 129 P.2d 1, 8 (1942) ("[T]hat cause which in natural and continuous sequences,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced the injuries, and without which
the results would not have occurred." The last clause, of course, states the but-for test).
188. See, e.g., Conor v. Flick, 64 Ohio App. 259, 28 N.E.2d 657 (1940). Contrast
Wheeler v. Milner, 137 Wis. 26, 118 N.W. 187 (1908), where the court recognizes the
theoretical inadequacy of the directness test but holds a charge embodying it harmless
error where there was no intervening cause.
189. As in State v. Columbus Hall Ass., 75 N.D. 275, 27 N.W.2d 664 (1947).
190. 34 WoRDs & PHLAs s 717 et seq. (Perm. Ed. 1940), and current supplements.
191. See also DEcENNiAL DIGzsEs, NEGLIGENCE 58, 59.
192. WoRDs & PHRAisEs does not do justice to the "substantial factor" test. Per-
haps the strongest adherent to this test is Connecticut. Mahoney v. Beatman, 110 Conn.
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or no following. We have indicated above the extent of the limited acceptance
of the last wrongdoer 193 rule, the cause-condition formula,'9 4 and the limita-
tion in terms of time and space gaps.195 So far as the more generally recog-
nized tests go, it will be clear from what has been said that it is fruitless to
classify states as having adopted one or the other. A few jurisdictions
purport to reject specifically certain tests and to be satisfied only with
certain others. 96 But this sort of thing is largely a battle of words. What
is needed is a separation between the issue of cause and all the other issues,
which are often meritorious in themselves but too frequently parade meretri-
ciously in the guise of cause. Perhaps this would affect substantive results
only a little, but-it would contribute much to clarity of thought.
184, 147 AtI. 762 (1929); Kinderavitch v. Palmer, 127 Conn. 85, 15 A.2d 83 (1941).
Since it was adopted in the RESTATEmENT, a number of other states have accepted it.
Herzberg v. White, 49 Ariz. 313, 66 P.2d 253 (1937); New Orleans & N.E.R. Co.
v. Burges, 191 Miss. 303, 2 So.2d 825 (1941); Giles v. Moundridge M. Co., 351 Mo. 568,
173 S.W.2d 745 (1943); Klein v. Herlim Realty Co., 184 Misc. 852, 54 N.Y.S.2d 144,
aff'd, 269 App. Div. 934, 58 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1st Dep't 1945) ; Simon v. Hudson Coal Co.,
350 Pa. 82, 38 A.2d 259 (1944); Weaver v. McClintock-Trunkey Co., 8 Wash.2d 154,
111 P.2d 570 (1941) ; Hatch v. Smail, 249 Wis. 183, 23 N.W.2d 460 (1946).
193. See pages 806-8 supra.
194. See pages 803-4 supra.
195. See pages 801-2 supra.
196. Minnesota, for example, has rejected the "substantial factor" test. Seward v.
Minneapolis Street Ry., 222 Minn. 454, 25 N.W.2d 221, 224 (1946) ("Proximate cause is
not adequately defined by merely telling a jury that a 'material element or substantial
factor' in causation is a proximate cause. . . . [It] leaves the jury afloat without a
rudder."). But cf. Anderson v. Johnson, 208 Minn. 373, 294 N.XV. 224 (1940). Wis-
consin, which for many years espoused the "natural and probable consequence" test, has
recently indicated limited approval of the "substantial factor" test (see note 192 supra),
but many years ago specifically rejected the "direct-indirect" test. See Mauch v. Hart-
ford, 112 Wis. 40, 58, 87 N.W. 816, 823 (1901); Wheeler v. Milner, 137 Wis. 26, 28,
118 N.W. 187, 188 (1908) ; Meyer v. Milwaukee, 116 Wis. 336, 339, 93 N.W. 6 (1903) ;
and Connecticut's wholehearted adoption of the "substantial factor" test. has on one
occasion resulted in an unnecessary rejection of the foreseeability test. Corey v. Phillips,
126 Conn. 246, 255, 10 A.2d 370 (1939).
It is not suggested, of course, that such a specific rejection will be a conclusive and
inflexible proscription in a jurisdiction for all cases and for all time. And use of a
proscribed formula in any given case may be harmless error, as in Wheeler v. Milner,
supra.
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